The Evolution of Cooperation

Book Description

Updated for the first time, the classic book on why cooperation is not only natural but also the best survival strategy

The Evolution of Cooperation addresses a simple yet age-old question: If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation--one might even say altruism--is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations.

"This book, if read, grasped and applied, could have a profound effect." (Wall Street Journal)

"A fascinating, provocative, and important book." (Douglas R. Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach)

Customer Reviews:

Extended edition IS NOT EXTENDED!!!!.......2007-04-26

"The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations."

WHAT?? I bought this, with the new preface and cover, and it DID NOT CONTAIN NEW MATERIAL IN THE BOOK. I wrote the published, and THEY DID NOT REPLY. Crappers.

Reconciling Individual Interest with Collective Interest.......2005-12-10

The goal of a model is to explain complex reality with parsimony. This means that a model is a simplification of reality or approximation to some aspect of our world. Likewise, the goal of game-model is also to explain reality by abstracting the important features of reality for a particular problem.

Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game has represented the reconstructed reality of international politics without overriding or overarching government authority, because it does not only explain persuasively why states have suffered from the problem of non-cooperation, but also show what states should do in international anarchy.

In PD game, the more self-interest each player pursues, the more collective interest both players lose. Nevertheless, they can not stop pursuing their self-interests. Otherwise, they will be faced to the worst case. As a result, all of players do not escape from social inefficiency and eternal conflict.

Hobbes, who described human existence in the state-of-nature as Bellum omnium contra omnes, suggested Leviathan as the solution to the dilemma. However, in that states exist in "international" anarchy, the argument is meaningless. If Hobbesian state-of-nature is the reality among nations, the world is in a constant state of war.

Axelrod finds the new puzzle in here: In situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? His goal is to explain the cooperation under anarchy. To do so, he designs a variation of PD game with R > (T+S) / 2 value and introduces the concept of time. His explanation depends on the iterated PD game (IPD) where players do not know which is the final move.

Achieving socially efficient or Pareto-superior mutual cooperation in PD game is possible if the reciprocity works as times go by and the players consider the future consequences of their present actions with foresight (the reciprocity is emphasized much more than foresight). Especially, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy and the Shadow of Future play a core role in explaining cooperation.

First of all, he sets five preconditions for IPD: (1) players cannot make any threat or prior commitment (2) there is no knowledge of the other players¡¦ upcoming move, as each game is simultaneous (3) the interaction among players can not be avoided (4) there is no way to change the other player's payoffs (5) the only communication allowed is through the player's own prior behavior.

Also, the concept of a discount parameter, w, which represents the degree to which the payoffs of each move are discounted relative to the previous move, is introduced. Thus, w is the weight of the next move in the future. As times go by, value tends to decrease in negative squares.

This can be represented as the sum of infinite series. The higher the value of w, the more likely the players will meet in the future. Contrarily, since 0
From this setting, Proposition (1) is derived: If the discount parameter, w is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.

Also, Axelrod runs two computer tournaments by inviting the top game theorists, and reports that Rapoport¡¦s TFT was the best strategy. Although 15 programs in 1st tournament & 63 programs in 2nd tournament were submitted, TFT won all of them. TFT got the average score of 504.5 in 1st round & the score of 434.73 in 2nd round. Why?

He divides the reasons into 4: (1) TFT avoids unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player cooperates; this is being nice and never being the first to defect (2) TFT has no hesitation in retaliating in the face of the other's defection; that is, TFT does not wait to see if the defection was a mistake, as defection is to be punished immediately.

(3) TFT is open to forgiveness after responding to a provocation; in this way, a TFT player do not wait to reward cooperation (4) TFT has the clarity of behavior, so that the other player can adapt to TFT pattern more easily than others (TFT program length was the shortest). Thus, TFT could do well over a wide range of environments, against both nice and defection strategies.

Next, the stability of cooperation based upon TFT is discussed. He explores the relationship between a native population uniform strategy & a newcomer strategy. He assumes the existence of a native population employing strategy B & a newcomer using strategy A.

If the players interact with each other one at a time, the expected utility of the newcomer with A might be higher than the expected utility of one of the native population. In that case, A is said to invade B.

Otherwise, B is said to be collectively stable. When p is the frequency of a newcomer interacting with other newcomers, the condition of invasion by newcomers is:

(p)*EU(newcomer|newcomer)+(1-p)*EU(newcomer|native)>EU(native|native)

If p is between 0 & 1, newcomers¡¦ strategies can invade the strategy of the native population and vice versa. So, can TFT invade All D? Can All D invade TFT? Assume w = 0.9.

(p)*EU(TFT|TFT)+(1-p)*EU(TFT|All D)>EU(All D| All D)
(p)*[R/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[S+(w*P)/(1-w)]>P/(1-w)
(p)*[3/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[0+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[1/(1-0.9)]
(p)*(30)+(1-p)*(9)>10
21p+9>10
21p>1
p>1/21

(p)*EU(All D|All D)+(1-p)*EU(All D|TFT)>EU(TFT|TFT)
(p)*[P/(1-w)]+(1-p)*[T+(w*P)/(1-w)]>R/(1-w)
(p)*[1/(1-0.9)]+(1-p)*[5+0.9*1/(1-0.9)]>[3/(1-0.9]
(p)*(10)+(1-p)*(14)>30
10p+14¡V14p>30
10p+14-14p>30
-4p+14>30
-4p>16
p <-4

Thus, when the shadow of future is very strong (w = 0.9), TFT can invade All D if there is more than 1 TFT invader for every 21 All D natives. It takes so few. Also, All D cannot invade TFT when w is sufficiently high (strictly speaking, the critical value of w for TFT to be collectively stable is 2/3).

From this, he derives additional 6 Propositions. The most interesting one among them is Proposition (6)The strategies which can invade All D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TFT. This means that cooperation is possible even in the world of All D, as long as small clusters of discriminating invaders with TFT have a small proportion of interactions in the Hobbes state-of-nature.

More interestingly, he shows that cooperation could emerge even without friendship. Let-and-Let-Live system (i.e., the static nature of trench warfare) might be considered as the prototype that small TFT interactions invaded the strategy of All D native population on war. However, Axelrod also mentions that the stability of cooperation based upon the reciprocity can be impaired by (1) the rotation of troops (2) the artillery less dependent on reciprocity for its life than infantry in trench (3) the raids.

However, pointing out that Chapter 4 is about interaction among human beings who can evaluate the reciprocity and respond to it rationally, he argues that such understanding by the participants is not really necessary for cooperation to emerge and prove stable.

Therefore, he argues that (1) cooperation is possible without morality or foresight as shown in the relationship between crocodiles and crocodile birds (2) the patterns of unconscious responsiveness of bacteria or organism might lead to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity (3) the evolutionary process depends upon individual advantage (not benefits to whole group), which unintentionally leads to the cooperation based upon the reciprocity.

In addition, he suggests four advices on how to choose effectively under a given strategic setting: (1) Do not be envious; TFT never wins head to head, so players must realize that an IPD is not a zero-sum game (2) Do not be the first to defect so long as the future remains important, based on Proposition 1 (3) Reciprocate cooperation and defection but begin with cooperation (4) Do not be too clever; be clear about your strategy so others can figure out what you are doing. Again, TFT is the strategy which satisfies all of the advices.

Especially, five ways on how to promote cooperation is discussed in aspect of changing the strategic setting: (1) Enlarge the Shadow of the Future by making the interactions more durable and more frequent (2) Change the payoffs; The change of payoffs determines the incentives of behavior (3) Teach people to care about each other (4) Teach reciprocity; Do not forget the negative effect of All C that might spoil the other players (5) Improve recognition abilities; Accumulate the credibility of reciprocity through good history of interactions.

Finally, the social structure of cooperation is discussed. The social structure influences on how the evolution of cooperation can begin. The influence might constrain or facilitate cooperation, or make the evolutionary process of cooperation dynamic. Namely, the relationship between the social structure and the cooperation in IPD can be understood as being equal to the relationship between the culture and the institution.

As the institutional performance depends largely upon culture, so the speed and the range of the evolution of cooperation is determined greatly by the social structure such as labels, reputation, regulation, and territoriality. Fist, labels (i.e., stereotype) might decrease the importance of the benefits due to mutual cooperation. This is related closely to the debates on the distributional effect of collective interest.

Second, the importance of reputation as a bully might delay the speed of cooperation. Third, relating to regulation, the government in here is not Leviathan, but a player interacting with the governed on compliance and flexibility. In this case, the efficiency of the exchange of flexibility with compliance determines the evolutionary process of cooperation among them.

Finally, in that the territorial system (i.e., positional picture) influences the way the players interact with each other which determines the course of the evolutionary process, territoriality as the social structure matters.

Axelrod concludes: (1) Cooperation has staying power but the biggest problem is getting cooperation started (2) Ratchet effect: Cooperation is successful incrementally, as clusters of cooperation build upon clusters cooperation (3) Cooperation is a rational possibility, even without a central authority, as long as the future is sufficiently important (4) Reconciling individual interest with collective interest is possible by TFT.

Recently, Fearon (1995), Morrow (1999) and Powell (2005) argue that one of the reasons why the Pareto-inferior outcomes such as ex post costly wars have recurred is due to the commitment problem. Morrow (1999: 92) maintains, Commitment is a problem when actors' incentives change over time.

Although Axelrod and they consider the concept of time seriously, their conclusions are totally different. While they focus on explaining the cause of war in PD (i.e., In PD, one player's commitment to C can not be believed by other player), his interest is placed on explaining the cause of cooperation in PD (i.e., what matters in PD, is not unilateral commitment, but mutual learning effect by TFT).

However, Axelrod seems to be superior to them, because he might explain both war and cooperation with the level of w. But, Fearon, Morrow, and Powell might suffer from selection bias, because the commitment problem explains only wars.

References

Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.

Fearon, James D (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414.

Morrow, James D (1999). The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 77-114.

Poundstone, William (1992). Prisoners' Dilemma. Anchor Book.

Powell, Robert (2005). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization (forthcoming)

The evolution is just beginning.......2005-09-10

Amidst the glowing 5-star reviews I feel the need to interject some concerns and outright criticisms of this book, although I do recommend its reading. Certainly the book provides a relatively good starting point in a very complex area, but it should not be construed as the final word on a much more complex subject. I do think that R. Axelrod provides an excellent, if at times overbearing, presentation of how game theory, specifically in the realm of an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) scenrario, can explain a number of historical as well as daily situations. He goes on to expound on some good generalizations on how people might act to inspire more cooperation and these generalizations, if implemented by people (groups, governments, etc.), might result in a more cooperative world. For this, there are good things to say. But I would caution not to create from this any utopian potential for the real world.

The `winning strategy' of TIT FOR TAT (TFT) works because it starts out `nice' but it retaliates immediately if someone else does not `play nice', too. So this is not vision of world cooperation. It is a realistic vision of maximizing cooperation under specific conditions which he covers relatively well towards the later chapters. Ultimately, the natural take away is a hopeful view of a potentially more cooperative environment, with perhaps a bit of forgetting that unkind retaliation is an integral part of his winning `cooperative' strategy.

Here are some aspects which Mr. Axelrod alludes to but somewhat minimizes, in my opinion, in their impact on TFT's potential for success in real world interactions:

a) The IPD strategies, which were submitted by experts from around the world, were submitted to computerized testing to determine which strategies `win' the most. This is based on an established point system that awards different points for different actions by two players. (This is summarized in one review already, so I will not repeat it here.) While this makes the playing of the game easy and consistent, it does not reflect the real world conditions which often exist. For example, if, in one turn, one player `defects' and the other `cooperates', the point system says the defector `wins' 5 points and the cooperator gets nothing. Are all defections `equal' in the real world? Or are some interactions far more important than others, so therefore cooperating on small things but defecting on bigger things might result in different outcomes than would ever be accounted for in the point systems used in these studies? Intuitively, a major defection may have far more significance (i.e. point value) than a minor one, but to accomplish his analysis, Axelrod's point structure is always the same.
b) Related to the above, are all joint cooperative efforts or joint defections `equal' as implied by the point values? (When two strategies cooperate, each is awarded 3 points. When each defect, they each get 1.) At the time this book was being published, an interesting `real world' example was playing out which would question this very assumption. At that time, Reagan was building up the military and the Soviet Union was `matching' the build up. You can either view this as mutual defection or mutual cooperation, depending upon whether you view cooperation as always a `positive' thing. In any event, the results of these mutual actions were NOT equal. The US had far more resources to invest in the game so each time `points' were awarded, the US actually gained more than the Soviets who eventually had to stop playing. Consistent point values simply do not account for this, unless one wants to interject additional elements not presented in Axelrod's work.
c) Related to point b), the IPD study presents things from a vantage point that each actor starts out from an equal footing and therefore the only functional question is whether one strategy consistently wins in such a way as to keep near the top of the point standings. In reality, rarely does any person or group begin interaction on an equal footing. What I am trying to raise is not the same as his discussions in Chapters 8 and 9 on the strength and growth of various strategies in a world starting out with many different strategies. In those scenarios, some strategies die out because they stop having sources of points to take from others. But what if each strategy starts out from an unequal basis, some having significantly more `capital' to expend and coupling this to a more realistic scenario where each interaction is not free, but each has a cost to the participant (somewhat like putting your bet down before you play poker - you may win or lose, but if you lose your position is not the same as when you started, it is less than when you started). In such a scenario, which is more realistic in terms of how companies, governments and even people interact, the results would be materially different. So the starting premise of Axelrod's IPD scenario and point schemes may be so well constructed as to make for interesting descriptions of some specific and even common interactions, but it may be too well constructed to be able to be extrapolated to many more complex situations.
d) Another weakness is the assumption that all defections are of the same magnitude. If, in an otherwise nice political campaign (ever seen one of those?) a small, third party candidate launches an attack ad and the attacked major party retaliates, is the retaliation equal? Or, again, does their starting point allow them to annihilate the attacker? (Since I have never seen a positive political campaign, you can interject any other similar scenario which might actually come up in real life!) The `equal points for equal actions' premise is inherently flawed. Yet this is the basis of much of the book's conclusions.
e) What is the end result of a universe where everyone uses a TFT strategy? This is only marginally considered, at best. While the issue had been in my mind throughout much of the book, it was not until fairly late that Axelrod makes clear, albeit briefly, that in any set of two player interactions, TFT will at best result in the same total number of points as the other player and, for a number of reasons, probably slightly less. In other words, the person, company, group or government using a pure TFT strategy must be happy being close to the best in whatever the interaction. Personally, I am fine with that, thank you! But to assume that everyone is and that nobody will come up with a disruptive strategy that, perhaps only for a time, garners more points but winds up putting them on top of the heap in whatever competition may be in play. If the end game is the Superbowl, being second is not gratifying. Ask Philadelphia.
f) Finally, I found some of the descriptors attached to the strategies interesting, especially in light of Axelrod's ending recommendations on cooperation. Some strategies which attempted to use planned defection as part of their strategy were labeled as `meanies' while other strategies that started their initial moves with cooperation were labeled as `nice'. I find it interesting that a `scientist' would use such descriptors to classify things given that they bring with them connotations. Even TFT could be construed as a `meanie' since one of its logical outcomes is that it cooperates once, and once only, only to defect from then on based on the other parties action. Are all non-cooperative interactions except one inherently more `nice'? This is not important in the scope of my real concerns, but I always sense a red flag rising when an otherwise objective presentation resorts to affect-linked labels to make part of its case.

All of the above is NOT to imply that I think Axelrod's work is wrong and should be thrown out. I simply felt that, unlike the rest of the glowing reviews, Axelrod's work does not go far enough and leaves some gaping holes yet to be explored. Read this book, but keep your eyes and mind open for the flaws which seem to be thinly covered with papier-mâché.

How mutual hostility can evolve into cooperation........2005-03-01

Without question, the case studies in this book have applications in biology, sociology, international relations, economics and business. The basic question put forward is, "How is it possible, that in an environment of mutual hostility where acting selfishly will lead to gain against your opponent(s), cooperative behavior between the antagonists will emerge and become the dominant long-term behavior?" It turns out that it is easy to see how such behavior can emerge, even in hostile battlefield conditions. In fact, cooperative behavior has distinct evolutionary advantages.
The solution is found within game theory, in particular the situation known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two people, (one and two), who jointly committed a crime are arrested for the crime and placed in separate rooms where they cannot communicate. The police interrogate him or her separately and offer each individual a deal. If they defect and testify against their comrade, they will be given a reduced sentence. In this situation, there are four possible outcomes:

1) Neither defects - both go free, each is considered to have earned a positive reward.
2) One defects and two does not - one is set free and two serves a long sentence.
3) Two defects and one does not - two is set free and one serves a long sentence.
4) One and two both defect - each serve a reduced sentence.

In the problem, reward values are assigned to the results, and typical values are

1) Both one and two are both assigned a value of +3.
2) One is assigned a value of +3 and two the value of -5.
3) Two is assigned a value of +3 and one the value of -5.
4) One and two are both assigned a value of -1.

It is clear that each prisoner wants to avoid the situation where they are the only one who serves time in jail. Therefore, if this event will only occur once, then option four will be the result and cooperation will not take place.
However, if both prisoners have the potential for a future relationship, where that relationship has the real potential for rewards for cooperation and punishments for defecting, then option one can emerge. The best demonstration of this is what took place in some sectors of the western front in the First World War. When the same units faced each other for extended periods of time, a live and let live policy emerged on both sides. Each side adopted a strategy of not engaging in lethal force, unless the other side did. When required to expend artillery ammunition to demonstrate aggressiveness to superiors, they would shoot the same target at the same time of the day. Since their firing was predictable, soldiers on the other side would know to avoid that area and in fact would often climb out of their trench to observe the explosions.
There were instances where German snipers would demonstrate their prowess by continuing to hit the same position on a wall until they made a hole. Therefore, even though superiors admonished the soldiers to continue to kill the enemy and both sides had the capability, the fact that they had a lengthy relationship allowed the cooperation to occur. These phenomena did not take place in regions where units did not face each other for extended periods.
The first chapter describes tournaments, where computer programs competed against each other by defecting or cooperating and the scoring is similar to that of the Prisoner's Dilemma already mentioned. What emerged as the most successful tactic, even when the results of the first round were incorporated into the second round, is the TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is very simple, cooperate in the first round and for each successive round, do what the opponent did in the previous one.
I was fascinated by these results and it was easy to see the obvious implications for relationships of all types. For cooperation to occur, all that is necessary is that there be the expectation of a continued relationship and the potential for future rewards/penalties. What makes it especially interesting is that no appeal to morality, ethics or any other abstract concept need be made. The behavior occurs as a consequence of an increase in the long-term gain for all parties.

Published in Journal of Recreational Mathematics, reprinted with permission.

Be good, be fair and forgive.......2005-02-16

A mathematical tale of how, if cooperation can benefit parties (which it very often does), the most profitable behaviour is initial trust (offer a hand), mirroring reciprocity (good for good, bad for bad), total forgiveness (only account for the last move) and lack of any further cleverness, calculations or speculations.
The most amazing results are that, if behaving this way in a minimally stable environment, you never benefit more than your counterpart while you always benefit most overall, that you systematically promote total cooperation, that a few pioneers can teach large groups of non-cooperative bullies and that this behaviour beautifully resists aggression.
The work of Robert Axelrod is amazing in its transparency and applicability, and enlightening in its hopeful conclusions. Thumbs up.

Average customer rating:

Not his best
Layman's intro to Game Theory
Good revew of game theory
Well written for the everyday reader
Definitely worth getting

Prisoner's Dilemma
William Poundstone
Manufacturer: Anchor
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 038541580X
Release Date: 1993-01-01

Customer Reviews:

Not his best.......2007-09-10

I liked Poundstone's Labyrinths of Reason: Paradox, Puzzles, and the Frailty of Knowledge much more than this book. I don't think Poundstone really knows how to write history or biography. He tends to pile up quotations (too often from popular newspaper and magazine articles) rather than offer any deeper sense of Von Neumann and his time. I was not entirely pleased with his presentation of game theory - it would have been much clearer had he made use of the notion of a "dominant" strategy. Some of his explanations are confusing. People interested in getting a quick understanding of what game theory is about might be better served by chapter six of Martin Hollis's The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy).

Layman's intro to Game Theory.......2007-08-25

I enjoyed this book and learned a lot. The author weaves the fundamentals of game theory through significant historical events. I particluarly like the examples and discussions the author presents to put the theories and dilemmas into realistic, social contexts.

Two drawbacks: the lack of a technical theorem guide or appendix; and, the way the book lacks something that ties it all together. It loses momentum when Von Neumann's story ends. The last quarter of the book is abrupt as it runs through a group of definitions that fit under the game theory umbrella.

Overall, it's a good enough balance of storytelling, logic and game theory fundamentals to recommend it to anyone interested in social theories, and the how game theory relates to political and economic policies.

Good revew of game theory.......2007-07-22

This book gives a nice casual/historical review of the events surrounding game theory and parts of the cold war.

Well written for the everyday reader.......2007-04-24

As someone familiar with the concept of game theory especially the prisoner's dilemma, I found this book to be particularly informative, on a layman's level. The history/biography of Von Neumann was interesting, and the applications of theory were appropriate. If you are looking for a purely scientific read, this is not for you, but if you are looking to be able to talk about a prisoner's dilemma and have some more cultural literacy, this is a good read.

Definitely worth getting.......2007-03-27

I liked all three of this authority's books. Definitely worth getting, and be prepared for some eye-openers and challenges.

Average customer rating:

Interesting and Complex
Every bit as good
An Excellent Read, Brings back memories of the tv series!!
Toss Out Those Old Novels - THIS Is The Real Deal!
The Prisoner's Dilemma - The Unmutual Website's Verdict

The Prisoner: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Jonathan Blum and Rupert Booth
Manufacturer: Powys Media
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
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ASIN: 0967728053
Release Date: 2005-03-31

Product Description

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA is the first in Powys Media's new line of novels based on the classic television series, THE PRISONER. Things are changing in the Village--the charming holiday camp for the disappeared, the civilized prison for those who know too much. The authorities have found new ways of exploiting community spirit... using a lost pioneer of computer science to put their stamp on the coming Information Age. But then there's Number 18. She's a murderer... for the best of reasons. She's a bit of a collaborator, for reasons of her own. She's fiercely protective of herself. And she may be Number 6's best chance of out-thinking the authorities' newest attempt at control. But it all depends on what the Village's masters are really aiming for. Do they expect him to trust her... or destroy her? THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA features a foreword by J. MICHAEL STRACZYNSKI, the multiple Hugo-Award-winning creator of BABYLON 5.

Customer Reviews:

Interesting and Complex.......2007-06-27

I found the writing in this book to be much deeper than what is usually expected from fiction based upon a television show. The storyline went beyond a simple pastiche and delved into the workings of the Village, how prisoner Number 6's experiences with the Village are changing and shaping him, how the Village's masters might be "grooming" Number 6 to become a tool for their own purposes, or simply trying to drive him over the edge.

I also found the character of Number 6's potential ally equally interesting and "fleshed-out" as a mirror image of Number 6, but one who works through alliances rather than attacking as a lone wolf.

All in all, the story kept me guessing until the very end.

And you can't give a novel like this a better compliment.

Every bit as good.......2007-03-28

Every bit as good as all the previous "Prisoner" fiction. If you enjoyed the novels by Disch, McDaniel, etc., you're sure to find this one fascinating as well.

An Excellent Read, Brings back memories of the tv series!! .......2006-06-13

I am so very glad that I bought this book. I was at first scepticala about spending hard earned cash for another humdrumly written story, but this isn't one of those! Blum and Booth have created a novel worthy of being related to The Prisoner tv series. A must have for fans of the 60's tv series.
I'm grateful that it was finally offered through Amazon here in the USA. Thanks you Mr. Davy of The Unmutual for recommending this novel.

Toss Out Those Old Novels - THIS Is The Real Deal!.......2006-03-28

If you ever read THE PRISONER novels written by Disch, Stein and McDaniel, you may well have been disappointed.

Take heart in this all new novel - one which authentically captures the flavour of Patrick McGoohan's original portrayal and intent. It is quite a dense read, but don't let that put you off. This is as challenging and occasionally as baffling as some of THE PRISONER'S most convoluted episodes. There is an abundance of themes and ideas discussed within the pages. It's a novel designed to provoke reaction and thought.

The Prisoner's Dilemma - The Unmutual Website's Verdict.......2005-10-13

"The Prisoner's Dilemma" excels where other Prisoner novels didn't. It isn't afraid to keep the action moving. Barely a page goes by without a change of pace or a new scene to take in. But a book needs to have its action bound together, and this is perhaps the book's greatest plus point. There is not one central theme, but several - all relevant to the The Prisoner, but previously largely unexplored within the series.

The main themes - the cult of Celebrity, Mass-media, information technology, "Big Brother" Society, and terrorism, are all dealt with extremely well and whilst we might think of these as modern themes, and perhaps easy for the writers to explore, it's not so easy in practice to inject these into the Village setting, but somehow Blum and Booth manage to do just that.

When reading about a character called Number Six, one can't help but picture McGoohan uttering the lines, or performing the actions, and whilst this is the fault of this reviewer, the authors have to accept that in setting the book during the TV series, with McGoohan's Prisoner the lead character, most people reading the book will be doing the same. And this is perhaps the book's one failing, despite at times a damn good effort by the writers.

After a while I mentally changed from thinking of Number Six as McGoohan but as a "generic" Prisoner. This makes the book a more enjoyable read, in my opinion, but does this mean the authors have ultimately failed? Possibly, but not as far as I am concerned. "The Prisoner's Dilemma" isn't an additional episode fitting perfectly into "The Prisoner", but it doesn't have to be. It isn't an indispensible aspect of the "Prisoner" opus alongside such greats as "Free For All" or "Checkmate", but it was never meant to be. It isn't a perfect example of McGoohanesque dialogue. That would be impossible.

What it is is a very good read. The themes explored are brave, without being reckless. The writing includes humour, without lampooning the series. The approach is daring, without being arrogant. It references the series, without ripping it off. It's fast-paced, without getting sidetracked. And, perhaps most importantly, it dares to be different without being ridiculous.

Rick Davy (The Unmutual Website)

Average customer rating:

Enjoyed it but didn't get it
Good Writer, Story Tough to Follow
Not for all tastes
We Must TRUST One Another Or Die.
A fascinating story of micro vs. macro

Prisoner's Dilemma
Richard Powers
Manufacturer: Beech Tree Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

Contemporary | General | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books

ASIN: 0688073506

Book Description

Something is wrong with Eddie Hobson Sr., father of four, sometime history teacher, quiz master, black humorist and virtuoso invalid. His recurring fainting spells have worsened, and with his ingrained aversion to doctors, his worried family tries to discover the nature of his sickness. Meanwhile, in private, Eddie puts the finishing touches on a secret project he calls Hobbstown, a place that he promises will save him, the world and everything that's in it.

A dazzling novel of compassion and imagination, Prisoner's Dilemma is a story of the power of invalid experience.

Customer Reviews:

Enjoyed it but didn't get it.......2005-12-06

Strangely, although I very much enjoyed this book I don't feel like I got much out of it. Richard Powers' intelligence, imagination, and wonderful prose shine throughout, but I'll freely confess that I just don't "get it". The author was aiming very high but despite lots of moments where something profound seems just about ready to burst forth, in most cases unfortunately it never materializes. For example, each kid wrestles with "solving" dad's puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma. Near the end Artie finally has it... or at least I think he got it but I'll be damned if I can figure out what it was. Or why solving it did him any good. With the exception of dear old mom Ailene, the characters are interesting and well-developed, though in places less than believable. I get the feeling I'm supposed to admire sister Rach's pluck and razor sharp wit but instead she comes across as one of the most annoying people I thank god have never actually met. And having myself been in high school in the late 1970's I can categorically state that at least in my neck of the woods no one ever walked their girl home singing a "Buffalo Gals" duet and lived to tell about it.

The bottom line for me was that this book promised more than it delivered. The story strives to be profound but moments of true revelation are very rare. The book tries to be clever but it's really just the author not letting you in on a secret. The story is replete with humorous lines but only a few made me laugh. When I was much younger and read a book that I just didn't get I attributed it to my own ignorance. Though that's certainly a possibility here, as a now older and somewhat wiser reader who has successfully navigated many challenging novels I'm much less willing to give authors the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps he just didn't get the idea across.

Still, I definitely recommend this book. It's wonderful to read prose this well crafted. Powers is intelligent and ambitious and, perhaps best of all, sincere.

Good Writer, Story Tough to Follow.......2004-02-26

I recently finished reading Powers' first novel, "Three Farmers on Their Way to a Dance", and liked it enough that I decided to try some of his other work.

Prisoners' Dilemma is a very complex novel. Unlike some of the other reviewers, I felt that the characters were the book's main strength - they are rich, conflicted and masterfully crafted. However, especially toward the end, I got totally lost. I could not follow the story.

The first 100 pages or so were engaging and interesting, but the novel kept getting stranger, until at the end I was no longer sure what was going on. It could be that I am not as sophisticated a reader as I should be, but if you are like me, be aware that this book is a tough one to follow.

Powers can craft a masterful sentence, and his prose is really great. My problem was that all this great prose never turns into a great story, for me at least.

Not for all tastes.......2003-02-19

It's rare that I truly despise a novel, but that's the case with Prisoner's Dilemma. Powers is so steeped in the intellectual tenets of his "novel of ideas" that he seems to have had no time to spare for things like character and plot development. The result is pretension babble uttered by a collection of stick figures.

We Must TRUST One Another Or Die........2001-11-10

There is no better way to sum up this novel than to steal from W.H. Auden. The first time through this book, I knew there was a wealth of power and beauty hiding underneath it. Perhaps this is a novel that you have to read at a vulnerable time. Perhaps events such as September 11th compel me to say to those of you who will read this review in the future "Read this book to someone you love and weep with them for the world we now inhabit. We have relinquished our own ability to see the magic inherent in the world." If, during the Grand Inquisitor scene in The Brothers Karamazov, Jesus deigned to respond to the questioner, this is perhaps what he would have said. It is a novel that attempts to free us from the gated enclaves of the suburbs, the fear and nightmare of double deadbolts, the paranoia of opening mail. Eddie Hobson, Sr. is a man who feels that he must take on the burden of everyone else's mistrust, no matter the personal consequences. He is reduced to speaking in symbols, the better to convey all the aching meaning he feels for his family and the world. He, who is the least physically able, warps his entire family to his side, forcing them to relive his transformation from naive child of the midwest to one who has seen the Brave New World brought about by anonymous men in secret offices. This novel is multi-layered, complex, and deep in ways that make this, IMHO of course, the best explanation of the American Experience since WWII. It's better than Delillo's Underworld by quite a way, and if, you want to escape from the realizations Powers forces upon you, there's always Chapter 11. Everyone's had their own version of Chapter 11, and it is gorgeous. I wanted to call people last night while reading it, just to share the wonder and beauty of it with someone. Fantastic novel, fantastic author, this book chides us with the realization that the only way out of the self-imposed isolation we've managed to hide ourselves in is to fight it every day.

A fascinating story of micro vs. macro.......2001-09-29

If you're reading a novel which endeavors to link the lives of a Midwestern family in the late-1970s, World War II-era homefront politics, and Walt Disney, then you're going to want someone competent at the helm. On a superficial level, Richard Powers must be the man, since he's got a genius grant from the MacArthur foundation. Furthermore, he's adroitly constructed even grander Novels of Ideas like Galatea 2.2 and The Gold Bug Variations. His name inevitably comes up when critics are discussing the important young writers responsible for narrating our foray into the next millennium, along with William T. Vollman, David Foster Wallace, and Rick Moody-the "tall white male writers," as Wallace once put it.

But it took me a while to see what makes Prisoner's Dilemma the sprawling, history-rewriting novel of ideas it's been hailed as. For the first fifty pages or so, it reads like a comfortably traditional family novel reminiscent of Anne Tyler-which it is, on one of its multiple planes. But then Powers starts throwing in pseudo-factual flashbacks to the forties, with Walt Disney making wartime propaganda films (which he actually did, though not in the scope this novel suggests) and young Eddie Hobson (Sr.'s) eventual appearance in this surreal historical thread.

In less capable hands, Prisoner's Dilemma would probably come off as very, very formulaic, and just plain all-been-done-before boring. What rescues it? Well, for one, Powers' prose is beautiful and compelling. This alone should save the novel from complete damnation. The language during the italicized wartime passages is omniscient and confident, assuring us we're in capable hands as we struggle to understand-via Artie, via Eddie Sr., via ... Mickey Mouse?-the monstrosity that was the Great War. The language during the chapters set in 1978 is, by comparison, rather objective, but it still has plenty of intrusive third-person commentary inserted, lending an existential lushness to such simple acts as setting the table or playing catch in the backyard. This refusal to take for granted the mundane characterizes Powers' treatment of the Hobsons' dilemma, and, in turn, Eddie Sr.'s life. The mysterious illness that ravages Eddie and confounds his family is a physical manifestation of the ongoing battle within Eddie-a relentless tension between the Big Picture and the plight of the individual. The universal struggle to understand how one little person can matter in the midst of an incomprehensibly vast cosmos-a dilemma we all experience at some point-is magnified and played out continually in Eddie to such an extent that it precludes his ability to function adequately in the "outside" world.

The question of how humanity copes with the mounting onslaught of technological chaos is addressed repeatedly throughout Powers' narrative. During World War II, Powers recognizes that one of the greatest curative forces for Americans dealing with the war was, as it still is today, entertainment. In this case, the salve is Mickey Mouse and the whole Disney enterprise, enjoying its original heyday during the late thirties and early forties. Whole chapters are devoted to the role Disney played in the war, especially in the plight of the thousands of Japanese Americans interred Stateside. More generally, Powers describes Disney's function as a very early incarnation of the white noise in which we swaddle ourselves, in an attempt to keep out the horror we know is occurring out there: "[Mickey Mouse's] immense popularity must come from our learning, in a few years, how to ignore things that would have frozen previous generations with total horror" (98). Personified, as it is here, by such a congenial persona as Mickey Mouse and the rest of his Disney pals, it's hard to see how white noise could be all that bad. And Powers makes it clear that our relationship to the noise is ambivalent. We need it, and as much as we might decry it in attempts to elevate ourselves to more enlightened planes of world-awareness, we like taking refuge in Disney movies, or any incarnation of the entertainment noise we prefer. If the escapist quality of entertainment blossomed with Disney, and continued to grow throughout the seventies, when Artie is speaking, we in 2001 hardly need to be reminded how powerful and pervasive a mixed blessing it is now. Think of the samizdat in Infinite Jest that entertains its viewers into comas. Or, more immediately, consider the ways in which our country will-and already has-use pop culture as a psychological salve for the trauma of September 11.

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The Prisoner's Dilemma
David Edgar
Manufacturer: Nick Hern Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Theater | Performing Arts | Arts & Photography | Subjects | Books
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ASIN: 1854596314

Book Description

Starting with international peace brokers playing simulation games on a univeristy campus, David Edgar's intensely political new play spirals upwards and outward to present a situation of real conflict over bloodily unresolvable life-and-death issues.

Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles

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Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles
Max Black
Manufacturer: Cornell Univ Pr
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0801422302

The Dilemmas of Corrections: Multidisciplinary Perspectives

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The Dilemma of Corrections: It doesn't correct!

The Dilemmas of Corrections: Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Manufacturer: Waveland Pr Inc
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Criminal Law | Law | Subjects | Books

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ASIN: 1577663985

Book Description

Improving on its highly regarded predecessor, this new edition takes a multifaceted, well-rounded approach—addressing philosophical and historical perspectives on corrections as well as contemporary social and legal issues. Twenty-nine new selections (plus five retained from the previous collection) provide insight on the evolving philosophy behind punishment and imprisonment and address the historical evolution of corrections. Insights into current trends are supplemented by thought-provoking discourse about the future of contemporary corrections. Section introductions contextualize and explain the relevance of each reading.

Customer Reviews:

The Dilemma of Corrections: It doesn't correct!.......2007-07-13

I'll assume anyone looking to purchase this book is doing so for the same reason I did - It's required reading for a criminal justice class, or this area of Criminal Justice is particularly interesting to you. I took a "Problems of Corrections" as an elective class, and as a non-CJ major I found the material so fascinating I actually kept this book after the term had finished.

The book is a collection of essays compiled and edited by Haas and Alpert, which thoroughly, and perhaps exhaustively, covers America's criminal justice system as it pertains to corrections. The main focus of the book is based upon the questions of "Who do we punish? , "How do we punish?", and "Why do we punish?"; topics including the roots of corrections, history of punishments, famous SCOTUS cases, and international comparisons are among many other issues covered in this anthology. There is a diverse selection of readings with a mix of liberal and conservative perspectives on hot-button topics, such as the Death Penalty and Inmate's rights, so that you can leave feeling that you can form your own educated, unbiased opinions on many facets of Corrections. Overall this work is a great source of opinions on many topics of debate in today's legal system. The book is very academic in nature, and generally the essays are relatively easy reading.

For those of you who will be taking this class at Delaware, you'll probably be lucky enough to have Dr Haas as your instructor. He makes certain get your money's worth out of this text (and tuition too! He's an AWESOME lecturer) in order to succeed, as the lecture closely follows the topics present. Be sure to pick up Life Without Parole: Living in Prison Today as well.

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Prisoner's Dilemma
Anatol Rapoport , and Albert M. Chammah
Manufacturer: University of Michigan Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0472061658

Book Description

An account of many experiments in which the psychological game Prisoner's Dilemma was played

Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America

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Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America
Youssef Cohen
Manufacturer: University Of Chicago Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Politics | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books

Practical Politics | Politics | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books

All Titles | Qualifying Textbooks - Fall 2007 | Stores | Books

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ASIN: 0226112721

Book Description

Latin American democracies of the sixties and seventies, most theories hold, collapsed because they had become incompatible with the structural requirements of capitalist development. In this groundbreaking application of game theory to political phenomena, Youssef Cohen argues that structural conditions in Latin American countries did not necessarily preclude the implementation of social and economic reforms within a democratic framework.

Focusing on the experiences of Chile and Brazil, Cohen argues that what thwarted democratic reforms in Latin America was a classic case of prisoner's dilemma. Moderates on the left and the right knew the benefits of coming to a mutual agreement on socio-economic reforms. Yet each feared that, if it cooperated, the other side could gain by colluding with the radicals. Unwilling to take this risk, moderate groups in both countries splintered and joined the extremists. The resulting disorder opened the way for military control.

Cohen further argues that, in general, structural explanations of political phenomena are inherently flawed; they incorrectly assume that beliefs, preferences, and actions are caused by social, political, and economic structures. One cannot explain political outcomes, Cohen argues, without treating beliefs and preferences as partly independent from structures, and as having a causal force in their own right.

Antagonistische Kooperation: Elementare spieltheoretische Modelle spontaner Ordnungsentstehung

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Antagonistische Kooperation: Elementare spieltheoretische Modelle spontaner Ordnungsentstehung
Hartmut Kliemt
Manufacturer: K. Alber
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 3495475656

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