Customer Reviews:
Makers of Modern Strategy .......2005-09-22
"Makers of Modern Strategy" is a scholarly collection of high quality papers on strategy since Machiavelli to the present nuclear age. The beauty of the book is that one can focus on the era that one is interested in. There is no need to read the book cover to cover as the various essays are stand alone although they are presented sequentially and related papers are adjacent to each other. I have read and re-read some of the papers. The book is about strategy and the realities of war. The essays are clearly balanced and not biased. The phenomenon of war was clearly explained from the studies of past wars. It is clear that war has been a fundamental reality of social and political existence from an early stage of political organisation to the present times. The tragic aspects of war and the intellectual and emotional disturbances it creates could be discerned from the essays.
The book is divided into the following five parts:
Part One: The Origins of Modern War.
Part Two: The Expansion of war
Part Three: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War.
Part Four: From the First to the Second World War.
Part Five: Since 1945.
The eminent contributors include Peter Paret, Felix Gilbert, John Shy, Gordon A. Craig, Maurice Matloff, Condoleezza Rice, Lawrence Freadman, Michael Carver and D. Clayton James. Their essays showed the role of force in the relations between states. It is now very clear to me that war has always been a compound of many elements ranging from politics to technology, to human emotions under extreme stress. Strategy is one of the critical elements of war.
The various essays trace the ideas and actions of past generations, as they used war to achieve their national goals, an analysis of military thought and policy in the recent past and present
My favourite part is Part Two. Here three great historical figures are highlighted namely Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz. I can now see the genius of Napoleon as one of the greatest soldiers in history in its proper strategic context. I think history need to rescue Jomini from the obscurity he is now relegated since it is largely him who has clearly related the greatness of Napoleon and the attempt to reduce war to some sort of science.
Makers of Modern Strategy add immense value to any study of warfare and strategy. I recommend it to Army Staff Colleges and those studying military history at postgraduate level.
Mandatory Reading for Army Staff Majors.......2002-03-13
As the title indicates, the Army's Command & General Staff College requires students to read Makers of Modern Strategy in the core history class. Professors can make best use of this book as a supplement. As other reviewers have noted, the chapters are disjointed with each other. Taken separately, however, many of the chapters help the history student or enthusiast to develop a depth of understanding on a particular subject. Authors such as John Shy, Douglas Porch, Michael Howard, and Condoleeza Rice, just to name a few, explore many of the strategic issues involved with the evolution of military thought.
From Machiavelli and Clausewitz to strategies of world wars and colonial wars, Makers of Modern Strategy adds value to any serious study of warfare. The high quality academic research and thought that underlies many of the articles is worth the price of the book. Highly recommended.
Good general military history overview........2001-03-05
One of the essentials, a good starting point for the study of military history and strategy.
Still, this is a good book............2000-08-12
Although I agree with the reviewer preceeding me that this might not be as strong of a book as was the masterpiece which preceeded it (by Earle), it is still a strong book and does (generally) what it sets out to do: to provide an accounting of major developments in military thought (i.e. western military thought) from the Renassance to the modern age.
As a text or as a reference, this is still a powerful and useful book. Each of the chapters discusses a major figure's thought in a fashion that can be dealt with easily in a sitting: for those people who don't want to sit and sort through Jomini (though everyone reading this should sit down with Clausewitz! ) or Douhet, to see their rights and wrongs....
I like this book. I bought my copy for $8.00 in NYC and have had it with me through a number of moves since....
Newer is Not Necessarily Better.......2000-07-18
This second version of the book is disappointing. I would have thought that it being edited by an historian as good as Peter Paret would have improved on the original, which was edited by Robert Earle. However, it is weaker both in scholarship and accuracy, especially John Shy's essay on Jomini. Old myths are resurrected about the Swiss renegade whose own works are generally historically inaccurate.
Many of the older, more professional, historians, who are unfortunately no longer with us were much more careful in their research and writing, hunting down sources that newer historians either refuse to look for or refuse to use. they also were more blunt, calling a spade a spade, and weren't worried about offending people or in 'revisionist' (read inaccurate) history. Political correctness was unknown to these stalwarts.
Books of this type are highly useful. If you are looking for this particular volume, get the first version edited by Earle, even if you have to go looking in second hand book stores or on the internet in used book services. I did, and it is well worth the effort.
Book Description
This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.
Customer Reviews:
Some good information, but lacking in many areas.......2006-08-14
The book does provide detailed footnotes as it is a series of essays where the writer of each "chapter" presents their viewpoint and analysis. However, this book provides no tables or charts to support any of the analysis or discussions presented. It would have been very helpful if there were a table or chart comparing each nation's "innovation" in each category described in this book, examples: armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier development, etc.
What is most lacking in this book it that it focuses primarily on the US, Britain, and Germany, limited on Japan (amphibious assault and aircraft carrier development but nothing on their armor and combined arms tactics) and nothing significant on France, Italy, and Russia, who are mentioned merely in passing. This is the most glaring weakness of this book. Russia developed the T-34 tank, had a sizeable navy, large industrial base, naval infantry, paratroopers, cavalry, and actually trained with the Germans in the 1930's. The Italians were on the winning side of World War One, developed a large navy, their own tanks, and an ambitious goal to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, but they too are not mentioned.
It is important to learn how each of these major combatant nations developed as each had their own policies that led to successes and failures. An example is in amphibious landings, where the writer presents a view that the US was the most developed in the world during the interwar period. If that is the case, then why didn't the US attempt an amphibious assault prior to 1943 and why were the casualties so high in the first assault experienced at Tarawa? If the US was amphibious warfare strategy and doctrine was the most developed, then why did the British conduct the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 as a rehearsal, wouldn't the US have enough experience in northern Africa, Sicily, and Anzio in 1943? The writer's claim is not supported through citing successful battles or numbers of equipment produced.
Another question is why weren't the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians mentioned or compared to in amphibious warfare? If Italy wanted to control the Med, wouldn't they have developed some type of doctrine or equipment? The Germans thought about invading England, what kind of equipment did they have and how would they have executed the invasion? The Russian Naval Infantry, what was their doctrine? The Japanese amphibious landing is well researched and presented, but again, no tables or charts are presented to summarize the writer's viewpoint.
Russia's development during the interwar period is very critical as the equipment developed during the period was superior or at least equal to the German equipment. The T-34 tank's only weakness in 1941 was the lack of radio equipment along with the doctrine of dispersing the tanks instead of massing them into large formations. If one reads other WW2 history books, one learns that the Germans were only able to defeat the T-34 tank in 1941 with better unit maneuver and with greater numbers. German anti-tank weapons had no effect with the German tanks undergunned and under ranged. The largest caliber on a German tank in 1941 being the short barreled 75mm mounted on the Panzer MK IV and the StugIII (which was an assault gun found in anti-tank battalions).
Another glaring omission in this book is there are no discussions on anti-weapons or counter munitions designed to defeat the innovations being developed in the interwar period, the lone exception being the torpedo and US artillery proximity fuses. There are no discussions on the bazooka, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, shaped charges, depth charges, or anti-aircraft guns. Obviously the Germans had planned for anti-aircraft defense, otherwise they would not have developed the 88mm gun nor would have the deployed it so close to the front line troops. Rommel was able to repulse the British armor counterattacks at Arras, France in 1940 only with the 88mm anti-aircraft gun. This experience influenced him to utilize this weapon in a dual purpose anti-tank role in the desert. The British had attacked him in Arras with heavily armored Matilda tanks, armed with a 2-pound anti-tank gun, but no high explosive rounds against infantry. These cases are extremely relevant and important discussions into the interwar period.
Why did the British choose not to equip their tanks with HE rounds? Why didn't the Germans equip their Panzer MKIV and StugIII tanks with long barrel 75mm guns from the start? Why didn't the Russians equip their early T-34 tanks without universal radios (only the platoon leader had a radio)?
How was the Sherman tank developed and doctrinally planned to be utilized, a vehicle with an underpowered 75mm gun, prone to catching on fire, and a narrow track base not suited for cross country mobility (as described in the book Death Traps, Belton Cooper)? At the end of WW2, the US might have gotten directly into war against the Russians? How would the Sherman tank fared in the vast Russian muddy steppes and marshes and no highways? The Germans learned the hard way fighting against the T-34 an incorporated many of the features (wide track base and sloped armor) into the Tiger and Panther tanks. Was the Sherman tank designed to be an infantry support vehicle with anti-tank battalions designed to defeat enemy armor? What calibers of weapons were they equipped with and how were they to be employed? None of these questions are answered in this book.
Overall the book does provide some information that is interesting, such as the German night bombing tactics, use of the Stuka dive bomber to provide precision bombing, and the lack of reliable and powerful aircraft engines that prevented German strategic bomber development. However, the lack of direct comparisons (such as comparing the T-34 vs the Panzer Mark IV vs the Sherman Tank in armor thickness and armament range, penetrating power), lack of tables (such as showing the range and capacity of the Japanese aircraft carrier vs the US and British), charts (comparing the number of tanks and tank regiments fielded by Russia, Germany, England, France, Italy, US, and Japan in 1939), and complete omissions of the Italians and Russians is glaring and detracts to what could have been a well rounded and educational book.
Given the Editors' strong professional and education backgrounds, expected a lot more information from this book. Recommend borrowing this book from the library rather than purchasing it.
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.......2005-08-26
This book is a necessary for those who want to understand the relationship between development of technology and military innovation. It is not an easy book to read, but contains tremendous amount of information along with accurate historical records. Must for military tacticians and historians alike.
Essential Addition to the Study of the Inter-war Period.......2005-01-15
The acclaimed scholarly team of Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett have edited an anthology of essays encompassing the technological innovations in weaponry during the 1920's and 1930's. These innovations span the research and developments of all the major belligerents that play a major role in the coming global conflict. Each scholar was instructed to compare and contrast his or her topic country with two other countries making this work not only a significant contribution in and of itself, but also a vital comparative study as well. In addition, the researchers were asked to structure their essays around three concepts: the strategic framework of the period, the organizational factors of the institutions under study, and the doctrinal framework of the services. Many of the contributing factors to victory and defeat in World War II are covered within the pages of this important work. Williamson Murray takes a look at "Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences," and "Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences." Richard R. Muller examines "Close Air Support: The German British and American Experiences, 1918-1941." Geoffrey Till discusses "Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies." But perhaps the most important chapter is Allan R. Millett's "Assault From the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the Wars-the American, British, and Japanese Experiences." Millett compared the development of amphibious doctrine in Japan, Britain, and the United States. The author concludes the U. S. led the way in amphibious warfare doctrine, initiating combined arms operations between air, sea and land that would prove to be a critical advantage in the pacific campaign. According to Millett, Japan started out impressively as was evident by its ever-expanding Pacific empire in the 1930's. Since every landing force became an isolated island garrison, however, Japan's whole amphibious program literally faded away. Great Britain, on the other hand, never had the economic resources necessary to implement a successful amphibious program. Millett concludes that factors such as budget and innovative foresight are vital contributing factors in technological innovation. The author is also quick to point out that in many cases, new weapons become obsolete as soon as hostilities begin. Generally, books of essays are usually disjointed and inconsistent. The guidelines and structure the editors have chosen have tied all the chapters in this book together nicely. This is arguably the best work on the inter-war period to emerge in years. Highly recommended.
Great historic analysis on military innovations.......2001-09-18
It is a very good review on how things developed between world wars. It provides a good insight of the thinking of the different countries and how they coped with their doctrines and how much they took an advantage of the WWI experiences.
I am rating 4 stars because actually I would like much more information rather than 30 pages on each subject.
Readable and Good.......2001-07-15
This is an anthology of various articles. Generally anthologies are the pits as they tend to lack a central them and the quality will vary. These articles are generally by the authors and as such they are of an even standard.
There are a number of chapters that discuss a range of issues from the use of Tanks to the development of the Aircraft Carrier.
The book is interesting although the area covered is naturally enormous and the amount of space that can be devoted to complex subjects is naturally limited. Despite this most of the essays are interesting and not only for what they say. In the first essay about the development of armored warfare by way of an aside the writer attacks Gueridian as a sycophant and also as a person whose reputation was largely the result of self publicity. Later the English theorists Fuller and Liddell Hart are critiqued as presenting overly schematic histories of the First World War which warped the truth to fit in with their own theories. Interestingly the essay then goes on to suggest that the first world war infantry battles were so complex that even now we struggle to understand them and for that reason it was no surprise that Douglas Haig had the problems that he did.
All in all an interesting book although again very much a starting point for the issue it covers.
Book Description
Since their inception, nuclear weapons have multiplied at an alarming rate, leaving everyone from policymakers to concerned citizens wondering what it will take to slow, stop, or even reverse their spread. With clarity and expertise, Joseph Cirincione presents an even-handed look at the history of nuclear proliferation and an optimistic vision of its future, providing a comprehensive survey of the wide range of critical perspectives.
Cirincione begins with the first atomic discoveries of the 1930s and covers the history of their growth all the way to current crisis with Iran. He unravels the science, strategy, and politics that have fueled the development of nuclear stockpiles and increased the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack. He also explains why many nations choose not to pursue nuclear weapons and pulls from this the outlines of a solution to the world's proliferation problem: a balance of force and diplomacy, enforcement and engagement that yields a steady decrease in these deadly arsenals.
Though nuclear weapons have not been used in war since August 1945, there is no guarantee this good fortune will continue. A unique blend of history, theory, and security analysis, Bomb Scare is an engaging text that not only supplies the general reader and student with a clear understanding of this issue but also provides a set of tools policymakers and scholars can use to prevent the cataclysmic consequences of another nuclear attack.
Customer Reviews:
Outstanding!.......2007-07-10
"Bomb Scare" is full of credible and helpful data, as well as balanced in its assessments.
Early on readers learn that it takes about 80 generations of neutrons to fission a kilogram of material - this takes about 0.8 microseconds and creates a temperature of 10 billion Celsius. A gun design plug in an enriched uranium bomb has to travel at at least 1,000 ft./second to initiate a sustained chain reaction. The Hiroshima bomb gun barrel weighed about 1,000 lbs. and was 6 feet long; the bomb itself used 64 kilos of U-235. Today this could be accomplished with 25 kilos and put into a package about the size of a small melon. (Plutonium could not be used in a gun design - its neutrons are too fast.)
Implosion-type designs are used for plutonium bombs. About 6 kilos was used for the Trinity test and at Nagasaki. Modern weapons use about 5 kilograms - about the size of a plum. (So much for the debate on whether "suitcase" bombs are feasible.)
The first U.S. H-bomb had a yield of 10.4 megatons.
The U.S. total stockpile of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons reached around 20,000 by 1960, vs. 1,600 for the Russians. (So much for Kennedy's argument that the U.S. had a "bomb gap.") We recently learned that during the Cuban missile crisis the Russians had already positioned about 100 nuclear weapons in Cuba.
There are five main reasons states acquire nuclear weapons: Security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. Different sides of the same reasons are also why many nations choose not to acquire such weapons.
Cirincione sees Russia as the #1 potential source of nuclear weapons/material for terrorists. It has thousands of nuclear weapons at 150-210 sites and hundreds of nuclear materials at about 49 sites. Experts believe that it would be difficult for terrorists to acquire a completed bomb - they are well guarded and utilize complex security locks. On the other hand, experts also believe that terrorists could construct a bomb from enriched material with only 3-4 technically people.
Pakistan is seen as a close #2 potential source. USA Today reported in November of 2001 that at least 10 Taliban had contacted Pakistani scientists in the prior two years. Pakistan has enough highly enriched uranium to make 50-100 bombs.
There are also about 40 nations with civilian stockpiles for power reactors. While not sufficiently enriched for nuclear weapons, it would be a simple matter to extend the enrichment process to create such.
Potential nuclear powder-kegs involve U.S. and Russian weapons being on 15-minute alert, and situations involving Taiwan, or India-Pakistan. Adverse recent events include the U.S. invasion of Iraq (increased terrorist and nervous state motivation to acquire nuclear weapons), our support for increased Indian development of nuclear weapons, U.S. promulgation of new logic for nuclear weapon use ("bunker-busters," use against non-nuclear states), and a slowdown/stop in reduction programs involving Russia.
The good news is that the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been cut in half over the past 15 years, those seriously considering their acquisition or having them have declined from 23 to 10, there has been a two-thirds reduction in ICBMs, and both the U.S. and Russia have destroyed their chemical weapons.
Author's Bottom Line: Cirincione believes that efforts must not only be directed at reducing nuclear weapons and proliferation, but eliminating the underlying sources of conflict as well.
History, security analysis and theory blends in a general text for any student of world politics.......2007-06-09
BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY & FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS begins with the first atomic discoveries of the 1930s and covers the history of the growth of nuclear weapons through the decades, right up to the current crisis with Iran and the threat of worldwide proliferation. History, security analysis and theory blends in a general text for any student of world politics and military history, particularly at the college level.
USAF Vet Recommends Five Stars.......2007-06-08
Those of us with a Top Secret "Q" Clearance during the Cold War are intimately familiar with the horrific realities of what a nuclear confrontation would mean for civilization. The author provides a concise, accurate, and up-to-date history of the nuclear threat. He also advances the best thinking related to diminishing the threats posed by nuclear arms in the 21st century, and putting the materials of decommissioned warheads to peaceful uses as fuel for nuclear reactors.
Overly Optimistic.......2007-04-09
This book deals with something that most of us don't spend much time thinking about. We should think about it more.
Cirincione, the former director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, takes the reader through the history of the development of nuclear weapons and the arms control agreements that have somewhat curtailed their spread. He presents a rational analysis of the drivers that cause states to seek to acquire nuclear weapons as well as the barriers that motivate some to turn away from the quest, or abandon it altogether.
And in the light of reasoned consideration he concludes, "The good news is that the nonproliferation regime has worked. The nuclear threat is less severe today than it was in 1970 when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force". He bases this assessment on the fact that "the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined from a peak of 65,000 in 1986, to roughly 27,000 today". But does this necessarily make the world a safer place?
Cirincione takes satisfaction that "the threat of a global thermonuclear war is now near zero". He goes on to state, "The dangers we face today are very serious, but they are orders of magnitude less severe than those we confronted just two decades ago from the overkill potential of U.S. and Russian arsenals. We no longer worry about the fate of the earth, but we still worry about the fate of our cities". It is in the ensuing discussion of nuclear terrorism that the upbeat tenor of the author's faith in the potential of negotiations and agreements to manage the imminent threat increasingly seems disconnected from reality.
While it is true that the threat of global thermonuclear war has diminished, the probability all out nuclear war was always very low as a result of the Strangelovian logic of mutually assured destruction. On the other hand, the likelihood of the detonation of a nuclear weapon smuggled into an American city by terrorists in the next decade is clearly significant. While such an event would not be the end of life on this planet, its societal, economic and political consequences would almost certainly be the end of life as we have come to know it. And, millions of people would die. This being the case, how can the author argue that the world is safer now than it was twenty years ago?
Cirincione also contends that the reduction in ballistic missiles is an indicator of a reduction of risk in the present day. What he neglects to consider is that weapons dispatched through alternate means - say in shipping containers with GPS activation - do not leave a return address, and as a result would not invite immediate retaliation. It would seem that a country hostile to the United States could launch such an attack with an impunity that would be inconceivable were the method of delivery a ballistic missile.
In this context it's hard to buy into the author's upbeat assessment of the future. As he would have it, securing existing weapons and stocks of fissile materials, new rounds of negotiations employing various carrots and sticks, and the good example of further disarmament by the US and Russia hold the promise of a better and a safer world. The problem is that while these actions are indeed necessary they are certainly not sufficient to produce the intended outcome. This is particularly the case given that some future nuclear adversaries may hold to apocalyptic world views.
Towards the end of the book Cirincione writes, "After wading through the history, theory, dangers, challenges and failures of proliferation policy, most readers could be excused for feeling a bit depressed. Don't be".
I guess I just can't help it. I am.
Sleeper Awake!.......2007-03-05
Perhaps the most significant issue in this century is not AIDS, the energy crisis, the environment or the Middle East but is the issue of universal nuclear disarmament. Joseph Cirincione has given us a clear solution to this problem in his book, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
The first recorded war between nation states occurred in 2700 BC. From that time to the present man has devised a plethora of clever devices to kill and maim his fellows.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union near the end of the last century (1991), the United States has funded the Russian government in the "cleanup" of warheads, bombs and other nuclear components scattered throughout the various nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Republic in an attempt to prevent terrorists and other non-nuclear nations from obtaining the same. Cirincione believes that "with additional funding, this threat reduction program could be accelerated to secure or eliminate the vast majority of nuclear weapons and materials by 2010."
The issue, of course, is that the "have-nots" want what the "haves" have: NUCLEAR ENERGY. Here the author proposes that a new system controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency would provide a supply of nuclear material to countries that need it for civilian use in exchange for an agreement that those same countries not seek to build facilities to create their own "nuclear resources".
Cirincione understands that it is impossible to convince the "have-nots" to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions and to adhere to nonproliferation norms while the "haves" assert the importance of these weapons for their own safety and security (read that Pakistan and Iran). As one state goes nuclear, another state is forced to do the same thing ad infinitum: "in short, proliferation begets proliferation." Cirincione whimsically wonders if the obverse is possible.
188 countries are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that became effective in 1970. The only countries that have not signed are: Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea has withdrawn. These are the countries the treaty has unsuccessfully prevented from obtaining nuclear resources. The original signatories, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China all agreed to ultimately dismantle their arsenals under a future agreement: to date that "future accord" has not happened. In fact, advances in this area have continued. Without compliance with this treaty, Cirincione posits the world faces a nuclear disaster.
In the end the author asks the reader to think beyond the old paradigms and to dare to explore ways to prevent what certainly, in the world's present state, is a sure slide into nuclear oblivion. This is more than a thoughtful book, it is a book every American should read and take to heart.
Book Description
Presented here together for the first time are the greatest of the ancient Chinese classics of strategic thought: The Complete Art of War. Probably the most famous work of strategy ever written, Sun Tzu's Art of War has sold millions of copies in many languages around the world. Lost for more than 2000 years and only recently recovered, the Military Methods of Sun Pin (Sun Tzu's great-grandson) is a brilliant elaboration on his ancestor's work. Only The Complete Art of War brings the wisdom of these two ancient sages into a single volume and gives the reader a unique opportunity to master the essentials of Chinese thought on strategy, organization and leadership.
The Sun family writings on strategy have proven their value through the ages, and they continue to reward careful study. By unveiling the complex, often unexpected, interrelationships of armies locked in battle, they reveal the enduring principles of success in the struggle of life itself. With a practical index to the essential principles of strategy, and Ralph Sawyer's thoughtful chapter-by-chapter commentaries, The Complete Art of War is designed to bring the reader new insights into the nature of human conflict.
Whether it is playing the game of politics or building a successful marriage, closing a deal or managing a large organization, making war or even making peace, The Complete Art of War stands as one of the ultimate guides to a deeper understanding of human affairs.
Customer Reviews:
Excellent.......2006-01-01
Bought a copy. Lost it. HAD TO buy another to replace it. An excellent book, Sawyers commentaries modernize and place in context applicable to today's managers. Clearly a lot of work went into his explanations. A must have, must read, must study. Provided me with months worth of reading material at lunch.
The teachings of the greatest military geniuses of all time........2003-11-10
Sun Tzu collected his teachings into the ancient Chinese treatise on military strategy known as "The Art of War" about twenty-five hundred years ago. Afterward his teachings were passed down through the Sun family, or a group of disciples, who edited or expounded upon the original writings until they assumed their current form. Sun Pin was the great-grandson of Sun Tzu, and he used the teachings of his brilliant ancestor to develop his Treatise "Military Methods". This wonderful translation by Ralph D. Sawyer includes both of these ancient texts.
"The Art of War" has been studied the world over by military, political and business leaders seeking to understand the nature of human conflict in all it's forms. Although thousands of years old, the teachings of Sun Tzu remain relevant even today. The maxims of Sun Tzu have been applied by students of "The Art of War" to such modern conflicts as the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Sun Tzu's teachings range from the seemingly simple, such as "Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests cannot advance the army", to the more complex and thought provoking, such as "In order await the disordered. In tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind." The manual covers such diverse topics as training, supplies, terrain, the seasons and the use of spys, and includes detailed commentary by China's greatest military leaders through the centuries.
"The Art of War" should be read by anyone who studies military history or strategy, and is part of the curriculum of many of the world's military academies. Studying the teachings of Sun Tzu can help you to form strategies for conflict resolution or negotiating in business, political or social endeavors through a greater understanding of human interaction.
Sun Tzu and Sun Pin are timeless.......2001-06-18
The Art of War is the oldest and best military treatise this world has seen. It is amazing how Sun Tzu can talk about strategy and warfare in thirteen short chapters. His book is just the best about competition and strategy. And now we get to Sun Pin, the military strategist. I have awesome respect for him. He was betrayed and mutilated by his best friend, and still, he survived. He defeated his nemesis in a great strategic way that Sun Tzu would have mostly likely done. These two are the best and if they were in this world today, they would won every war that we fight, by their ability to adapt. If you want to get Ancient Strategy and Chinese Culture, get this book.
Excellent.......2001-06-04
The publishing of both Sun Tzu's and Sun Pin's works together makes for a valuable purchase. I've found that this translation is also quite easy to follow, and the comments assist with interpretation. These works represent awesome insights into the nature of warfare.
suffering.......2001-04-20
The text does not remotely fill the entire page to lengthen the book and suggest a happier price. Sun Pin's addition is severely garbled because the original text was damaged and it's contadictory. The most likely reason that Sun Pin's methods were forgotten and preserved only in a tomb was because (GEE GOLLY) people believed it wasn't worth reading. The commentary uses the word obvious extremely often among various other uneeded lengthening exercises.The author describes himself as an imaginative entrepenuer.(Sun Tzu flirts with perfection)
Book Description
Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting. Michael B. Oren’s magnificent Six Days of War, an internationally acclaimed bestseller, is the first comprehensive account of this epoch-making event.
Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
Customer Reviews:
Needs more synthesizing.......2007-09-25
Accurate, detailed, long, too long. All the information you need and more is here, put in chronological order, from all sides, the planning and the making, the would-be's and the were, the personal interviews and recollections and the reporting. But it reads more as a police report than as an author book.
When it dwells into diplomacy and he-said and the other-said, its interests plummets, it becomes boring and frustrating. It's a huge work of collecting data all right, doing interviews to tens of people, etc, but I think readers would appreciate a more synthesized book than this one. Be specific, get to the point, don't just pour information like from a broken faucet. The author may use this as a lecture tool or as a text book in some college course, but for the general audience it's not fun.
Excellent hsitory.......2007-08-04
Great history, very readable, explains politics and is generally quite unbiased. Not a detailed military history.
Nothing like it.......2007-07-15
Pick up this book it's just amazing. it gives you details in a very understandable way. it's full of drama and a great page turner.
Slouching Toward the Apocalypse.......2007-07-14
If you only have time for one book about the Six Day War, make it this one. One may choose to quibble with this or that to show off one's discernment, but quibbles quiver before the stern mountain of fact piled up by Mr. Oren. Un-spun facts are the most valuable thing to a history buff. This book has them. Read why the war started. Read how the Superpowers set out their pawns. Learn the real meaning of the "arab street" and why it is important. Watch what happens when national leaders get caught up in their own propaganda. One caution, after reading how the brightest and best, from all of the countries involved, acquitted themselves, you may be tempted to follow the biblical injunction to "put not your faith in princes" with renewed conviction.
Must read!.......2007-06-27
This is an excellent book about the six-day war. The author is fair and impartial in his description. I Highly recommend it.
Average customer rating:
- The grandest of grand strategy
- Despotism the default state of human governance.
- Starts Strong But Quickly Devolves Into Minutia
- A series of wars punctuated by brief periods of peace
- Difficult but enlightening
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The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000
William McNeill
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Similar Items:
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The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community
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Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression
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Plagues and Peoples
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The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800
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The Causes of War
ASIN: 0226561585 |
Book Description
In this magnificent synthesis of military, technological, and social history, William H. McNeill explores a whole millennium of human upheaval and traces the path by which we have arrived at the frightening dilemmas that now confront us. McNeill moves with equal mastery from the crossbow—banned by the Church in 1139 as too lethal for Christians to use against one another—to the nuclear missile, from the sociological consequences of drill in the seventeenth century to the emergence of the military-industrial complex in the twentieth. His central argument is that a commercial transformation of world society in the eleventh century caused military activity to respond increasingly to market forces as well as to the commands of rulers. Only in our own time, suggests McNeill, are command economies replacing the market control of large-scale human effort. The Pursuit of Power does not solve the problems of the present, but its discoveries, hypotheses, and sheer breadth of learning do offer a perspective on our current fears and, as McNeill hopes, "a ground for wiser action."
"No summary can do justice to McNeill's intricate, encyclopedic treatment. . . . McNeill's erudition is stunning, as he moves easily from European to Chinese and Islamic cultures and from military and technological to socio-economic and political developments. The result is a grand synthesis of sweeping proportions and interdisciplinary character that tells us almost as much about the history of butter as the history of guns. . . . McNeill's larger accomplishment is to remind us that all humankind has a shared past and, particularly with regard to its choice of weapons and warfare, a shared stake in the future."—Stuart Rochester, Washington Post Book World
"Mr. McNeill's comprehensiveness and sensitivity do for the reader what Henry James said that Turgenev's conversation did for him: they suggest 'all sorts of valuable things.' This narrative of rationality applied to irrational purposes and of ingenuity cannibalizing itself is a work of clarity, which delineates mysteries. The greatest of them, to my mind, is why human beings have never learned to cherish their own species."—Naomi Bliven, The New Yorker
Customer Reviews:
The grandest of grand strategy.......2007-05-24
This is a sweeping history of the interplay between technology, society and war by one of the preeminent historians of our generation. Moreover, it is, in this reviewer's opinion, even more relevant today than it was when first published in 1982.
McNeill, quite naturally, observed the events of the past millennium through the lens of the Cold War and came to the conclusion that the current epoch was wholly unprecedented - weapons so powerful that they made their possessors weak because of their inability to flex any power - and that the global ideological confrontation would continue on as the defining feature of the twenty-first century. To the author's credit, he concludes the volume with these sage words: "But the study of [the] past may reduce the discrepancy between expectation and reality, if only by encouraging us to expect surprises - among them, a breakdown of the pattern of the future suggested in this conclusion."
The near future of 2007 does indeed look a lot different than anyone could have imagined in 1982 - but McNeill's themes are no less germane to the radically altered international environment that we currently find ourselves in. Two bear specific mention and consideration.
First, McNeill emphasizes the power of market forces and the incredibly stimulating effect the early markets of Western Europe had on technological development. By the time he wrote "Pursuit of Power," McNeill had come to see the return of command innovation where technological change is driven by the direction and investment of sprawling state bureaucracies, much as the feudal lords of Medieval Europe controlled military technology. But, if anything, the last quarter-century has witnessed the resurgence of market-driven innovation, mostly spurred on by the Internet and global communication networks, while the Cold War era military industrial complex has shriveled to a shell of its former self in the US and all but evaporated in the states of the former communist bloc. As huge chunks of humanity join the global market for goods and services - most notably China and India, but Brazil and other rapidly developing economies as well - one can and should expect robust growth and innovation around the world to flourish. The hallmark of such a system, as McNeill explains, is the rapid adoption and improvement of anything that works better than the existing model. Only now, rather than having the growth and innovation confined to Western Europe, it will become a much more (but not entirely) global phenomenon.
Second, McNeill sees improvements in transportation as the critical enabler to economic growth in Western Europe. At one point, he anticipates the rise of globalization and outsourcing in commenting on how the sudden growth of steam power threatened the wholesale destruction of British agriculture. Over the course of just a few years in the late 19th century, steam-powered ships became so fast and efficient that it was cheaper to import grain to London from the US, Argentina and even Australia than to raise it on local British farms. Thus, over the course of just a decade, a great number of English farmers were effectively "outsourced." We see the same phenomenon at work today, only it is the rapid efficiency in shipping information owing to cheap and reliable high-bandwidth Internet connections to India and other countries that make a number of American jobs suddenly cost ineffective and thus insecure.
In closing, this is a fantastic book and not just for military history buffs. It says as much about society, organizational methods, international economics, the process of innovation, and how technology shapes worldviews as it does about the impact of new weapons on war.
Despotism the default state of human governance........2006-02-05
Professor McNeill describes this 1982 book as a "footnote" to his famous 1963 The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, and as a companion to his even more famous 1976 Plagues and Peoples. The subject of "The Pursuit of Power" is warfare rather than disease, as in "Plagues and People", but Prof. McNeill's conceptual approach is the same. In fact, in the introduction to this book he describes armed force as "micro-parasitism" of the human race.
This is a densely-written and tremendously erudite book. It has 540 footnotes, all pertinent, in 387 pages. There are 21 very interesting illustrations, including a beautiful etching by Violet le Duc showing the use of the 16th century "trace italienne" in defensive siege warfare, Maurice of Orange's 1607 manual of arms for musketeers, and tank photographs from Heinz Guderian's "Panzer Leader". Every page is filled with interest for the general historian as well as the specialist in military affairs, but it is not light reading.
He elaborates on a few broad themes as drivers of historical change, echoing his previous work: Population growth, the development of markets, and the evolution of military technology. He states: "Indeed all humankind is still reeling from the impact of the democratic and industrial revolutions, triggered so unexpectedly in the last decade of the eighteenth century." He elaborates on these changes as they play out in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The last chapter, "The Arms Race and Command Economies since 1945" is by far the weakest. He is rather naive in his assessment of Stalin, and curiously equated the Soviet and Western systems under the rubric "command economy". He was myopic about the power of free market behavior in his own time and society, while being quite enthusiastic about it in medieval China.
This leads to a discordant "Conclusion", in which he describes the default political and economic state of the human race as being a despotic command economy. He believed that a "global sovereign power" was the only solution to the threat of nuclear war, the alternative being the "sudden and total annihilation of the human species." I think of the ideal state described by Socrates in Plato's "Republic" as he writes, "Political management, having monopolized the overt organization of armed force, resumed its primacy over human behavior. Self-interest and the pursuit of private profit through buying and selling sank towards the margins of daily life, operating within limits and according to rules laid down by the holders of political-military power. Human society, in short, returned to normal."
Like most who have envisioned a world government, he doesn't describe how such a power could possibly evolve, other than through brute force.
"Even Homer nods", and Prof. McNeill makes a couple of bloopers. He uses the term "hand gun" where most people would use the term "small arms". He attributes the bellicosity of Northern Europeans to their carnivorous eating habits, which required the shedding of much animal blood, and cites the Viking sagas for support, which I think is ridiculous. Plenty of non-Northern Europeans are carnivorous as well as bellicose, and there are plenty of bellicose peoples who eat little or no meat. But these are minor quibbles.
This book is important to everyone with an interest in history, especially the history of warfare. The future may hold some unpleasant surprises for the human species, perhaps including extinction through epidemic disease, nuclear war, or catastrophic climate change. The future is also, however, unknowable and may hold some surprises for us on the upside, despite Prof. McNeill's pessimistic vision.
Highly recommended.
Starts Strong But Quickly Devolves Into Minutia.......2003-12-05
...imho, mcneill's book starts strong, makes cogent points, but then quickly devolves into a morass of minutia...resulting in a tepid ending with no clearly stated thesis, and lukewarm impact all the way around...
...again, imho, it may have been preferable to focus on key developments that changed the course of warfare - with resulting consequences to the victors and the vanquished - then to relate how industry developed as a consequence in a ghoulish sort of 'virtuous-type-spiral', and, finally, to prognosticate where all of this will lead in terms of the final contours of an ultimate 'industrial-war-machine,' with resulting impact internally, externally and environmentally...
A series of wars punctuated by brief periods of peace.......2001-02-25
McNeill shows how military conflict and the advances in technology have stimulated mankind to better itself within the flux of a constantly changing balance of power. "Of War and Men" by Robt O'Connell also addresses this time honored conflict with a focus on culture, weapons technology and warfare.
A good read and an important book for those interested in a longer look at history and how we got here.
Difficult but enlightening.......2000-04-12
A quick warning to anyone who takes up the chore of reading this book. It is quite difficult to get through without serious reflection and time. It is definitely an enlightening book on the course of the world (not just military history) and the last chapter is truly one for discussion.
Book Description
The publication of The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road in 1972 marked the birth of the "new military history", which emphasized military organization--mobilization, pay, supply, morale and, above all, logistics--rather than military "events" such as sieges and battles. Constantly cited since its first publication in English (with translations into Spanish and Dutch), this revised updated second edition includes new sources and references but otherwise remains faithful to the original edition. First Edition Hb (1972): 0-521-08462-8 First Edition Pb (1975): 0-521-09907-2
Customer Reviews:
Spain at War.......2006-02-06
This is an internationally-renowned study of Spain's Flanders Army during the 80 year effort to suppress the Dutch Revolt. And justly famous it is too - due to the depth and care with which the anaysis is done, as Parker covers all the logistical problems encountered by early modern Spain, inlcuding finance, supply, recruitment, morale - pretty much everything you would need to know about the difficulties of military organisation in the period.
As such, the book opens a window on the problems mounting any type of large-scale operation by the early modern state: far from being a modern professional fighting force the Flanders Army was a collection of nationalities with which the Spanish government more often than not had to coax or encourage to fight on its behalf - a task complicated by the distance of the Netherlands from Spain and by the constant financial strains faced by the Spanish treasury.
Given such problems, it was a considerable achievement to keep the struggle going for so long, especially bearing in mind other challenges faced by the Spanish Empire, and it does give a lesson on how difficult it was (and remains) to maintain an effective military presence in a country far distant from home and whose inhabitants do not wish you to be there. A lesson which it seems is repeatedly forgotten.
G Rodgers
The last hurrah before Rocroi.......2002-06-13
This is one of those magnificent books for the specialist that stay below the radar of a general readership in History. The short narrative of the attack on the fortress of Maastricht is the stuff of martial legends, and worth the price of the book. G. Parker has become the foremost historian in English of Spain in 16th & 17th Century and specifically of the 30 Years War. This splendid monograph is the gold on the background of the Tercio's banners.
Book Description
A sometimes harrowing, often humorous, and occasionally tragic look at the Marine Corps from the inside out in its struggle with the insurgency in Iraq. Drawing from personal experience in the confusing, deadly conflict currently being fought in the streets and back alleys of Iraqi towns and villages, Danelo focuses on the young Marine leaders--corporals and sergeants--whose job it is to take even younger Marines into battle, close with and destroy an elusive enemy, and bring their boys back home again. Sadly, there are losses, but true to the Marine Corps spirit, they soldier on, earning their blood stripes the only way they know how--the hard way.
Customer Reviews:
blood stripes.......2007-06-02
the best book on the realities of marines fighting in Iraq. A gripping account of NCO'S living and managing a war in a hostile environment
A Moving, Gritty, Inspiring Book.......2007-03-25
Read this book, and you will have a better understanding of why the warriors who make up the United States Marine Corps are the elite fighting force they are. After reading this, I came to realize that I could never fully understand what it takes to become the "true" warrior, but it also made me thank God that we have them, and that they are there ready at all times to fight for us. This book is hard to read, in that the true lives of Marines in battle, under fire in less than optimum conditions, with brothers wounded or dying with alarming frequency, are all right there for the reader to deal with. It can sometimes be informative, even funny, but mostly heart-wrenching as the battles, which are being fought for us, hit home. Read this book, but be prepared to deal with emotions you maybe didn't realize existed within yourself.
A fascinating read.......2007-03-02
This gripping book brings the reader straight onto the ground in Iraq. A timely and important story, and a great read
A worthwhile read........2006-09-25
I picked this book up because Steven Pressfield's name was on it (he wrote the foreword). It's no Pressfield novel and I can't say that it's a particularly well written book, but Danelo does offer an important perspective - that of combat marines during the first battle of Fallujah. He relates the lifestyle and experiences of marines on the ground in Iraq and touches briefly on the effect of media and politics on the early stages of the war. I had hoped that more stress would have been placed upon the latter, but Danelo's book is primarily a relation of various marine's accounts of life and battle in Iraq. Throughout, he paints an admirable and fairly candid picture of marine combat forces. All in all, it's a decent book, though a little heavy on comparisons to scenes from movies.
An Inside look at the War in Iraq by USMC Grunts.......2006-09-15
There are emerging a slew of books coming about the war experiences in Iraq but most miss the unique view that is presented in "Blood Stripes - The Grunts View Of The War In Iraq". The author who was a Marine officer in Iraq writes brilliantly about how the war is actually being fought daily by those closest to the action--his NCOs. He allows us to see the action through the experiences of several young corporals and sergeants from infantry companies Bravo 1/5, Lima 3/7, Fox 3/7 and Kilo ¾ along with a headquarters company unit.
This book will take you to the action on the deserts and into the urban streets. The book follows these young NCOs from February through September 2004 where they were deployed in Al Anbar (Which is Iraq's largest province). They deal with the area known as the Sunni Triangle (That includes the city of Fallujh). Theirs is a chaotic and volatile world. They never know what they will be greeted with from moment to moment from the local people or the environment.
Fighting a war against an insurgency that borders on civil war, takes its toll on the men both physically and mentally. They never are sure if they will be facing an ambush or snipers as they move through the towns or the countryside. These men face the real dangers of world politics and yet continue to do their duty faithfully.
There is a toll on their souls as they witness friends and comrades killed or wounded. This book is at times is drenched in adrenaline and fear yet heroes do emerge and duty and honor are achieved. These young marines wear their "blood stripes" well and carry on the fine tradition of the Marines. (Only Marines ranked corporal and above wear the storied blood stripes on their uniform pants in memory of the Marines who fell at Chapultepec, Mexico, in 1847.)
This is a must read book for those looking for some understanding of what is going on in Iraq with our troops. The book is well written and riveting. It is a page turner! It is given The MWSA's Top Book Rating of FIVE STARS!
Book Description
Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the "nuts and bolts" of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history. First Edition Hb (1977): 0-521-21730-X FIrst Edition Pb (1979): 0-521-29793-1
Customer Reviews:
The Big L brought to the masses...kind of.......2007-04-06
Martin Van Creveld's Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton is a highly readable examination of the 'evolution' of the Big L, military logistics, as associated with European wars over the last few hundred years up through WWII. While armies, from ancient to modern times, "march on their bellies" - as Napoleon once said, and thus logistics provide the cornerstone of all successful campaigns, the Big L tends not to be popular reading among historians, amateur and profession alike; in other words military logistics is a hard nut to crack from a literary standpoint. Van Creveld's book is a serious, and at least partially successful, attempt to bring the Big L to the masses (re: not to bookstores and best-seller lists but probably most large metro and university libraries).
In his presentation of the material at hand Van Creveld is careful not to present overwhelming 'facts' and 'logistical trivia', and in doing so is able to keep the readers attention. On the other hand as 'facts' and logistical trivia' are the commodity of the Big L a fair portion of Van Creveld's conclusions and suppositions are hard to reconcile as the reader has little frame of reference from a data standpoint. Thus in trying to make his subject accessible Van Creveld in large part shortchanges the importance of the subject matter. Yet, his prose is accessible and one can walk away for an 'appreciation' for military logistics at a minimum.
Will the reader be well versed with military logistics after reading Van Creveld's book? Absolutely not. However, if one's interest is even slighted piqued by the story Van Creveld presents then there is ample material out there to lose oneself in with respect to the Big L; this is especially true of the dearth of data, statistics and pages dedicated to logistics of the second world war. In the end Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton does a fair job capturing the imagination of the reader on a topic so often lost to even the hardcore military historians out there. It fails to fully 'teach' logistical lessons, but that's forgivable given the subject matter and it's usual inaccessibility. 3.5 stars total.
useful intro to military logistics.......2007-03-09
This is an interesting and thought-provoking book. Much more has been written on this subject since this first came out but as a starting point for anyone interested in military logistics this book can still not be bettered.
Logistics for the Armchair General.......2005-06-28
It has been said that armchair generals think of strategy, whereas professionals study logistics. If that is true, Martin van Creveld has written a book on logistics for armchair generals.
Those familiar with military history and strategic studies are likely familiar with Van Creveld and his proclivity for making bombastic and sweeping assertions on the nature of warfare. "Supplying War" is no exception. (By way of example, he labels Operation Overlord "an exercise in logistic pusillanimity unparalleled in modern military history.")
Originally published in 1976, "Supplying War" was the first book to directly address the critical, but often ignored issues of logistics in warfare with a primary objective of identifying key themes and trends across time. Even Van Creveld's most trenchant critics - and he has many in the academic community - concede that his work was original and reached a large audience, and has therefore largely defined the debate on the subject.
Van Creveld reviews seven historical case studies (17th century feudal warfare, Napoleon's invasion of Russia, the German invasion of France in 1870 and 1914, and Russia in 1940, Rommel's 1942 North African campaign and the Normandy invasion of 1944) and comes to the following general conclusion: In pre-modern military history food (including animal fodder) was the primary logistical concern and most armies were forced to keep moving to survive by living off the land; but the rise of the modern, mechanized army inverted the paradigm, as ammunition and fuel supplies became paramount and armies were increasingly tied to rear-area depots for their survival.
"Supplying War" is as interesting and easy to read as a book on such an inherently dull topic can be. Given the broad impact the book has had serious students of military history will want to read it if only to understand Van Creveld's perspective and arguments.
I would add, however, that no one should read "Supplying War" without also consulting the extremely thoughtful and hard-nosed critique of it written by John Lynn in "Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present." Lynn's essay points out a number of serious flaws in Van Creveld's approach and conclusions. For instance, Lynn notes that Van Creveld conveniently avoids the issue of naval logistics, which happens to undermine his argument that military forces have only recently been engaged in serious logistical planning. Unlike armies, from at least the time of the Spanish Armada navies have had to engage in sophisticated logistical planning to ensure they had enough food, water and ammunition to complete their mission, and with the arrival of steam power they had to worry about fuel as well.
Lynn points out a number of other convenient omissions in Van Creveld's work, such as the successful use of railroads and steamboats for front-line supply in the US Civil War, the critical and successful role trans-Atlantic and -Pacific US logistics support played in both the First and Second World Wars, and the political constraints on 17th Century warfare that inhibited operations much more than logistical considerations. However, the most convincing (and damning) scrutiny of "Supply War" comes in a section titled "A problem with numbers?" in which Lynn comes very close to accusing Van Creveld of intellectual and academic dishonesty by twisting or misrepresenting quantitative data on the purported rise of ammunition and fuel as a percentage of the overall supply requirements and the selective quotation of certain sources.
In closing, add this book to your reading list, read it carefully and skeptically, consult Lynn's analysis closely and draw your own conclusions.
Accountants, Gamblers and Thieves.......2003-02-01
Studying this book one gets the distinct impression that some of the most acclaimed military men in history were gamblers with a lucky streak or in other words very successful thieves, who solved their own supply problems by stealing it.
That is how Napoleon did it while he was winning, but when he organized his own supply for the Russian campaign he lost. Likewise the Prussian general staff got a reputation for perfect planning while in the field the army operated by chaotic requisition. The Schlieffen plan was unworkable from the start, Patton won by stealing from his neighbor units and ignoring the supply bureaucrats and Rommel overextended himself without a chance of winning ...
Interesting perspectives that give lot of food for thought - even if they may be somewhat biased. For example when Creveldt blames the German general stuff for not preparing the Russian campaign properly he claims that Hitler 's decisions made sense ....
It is a pity that the book stops in 1944; Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf war would be very interesting by comparison.
the best book about the history of logistics.......2002-07-07
Martin Van Creveld provides an interesting overview of how logistics influenced the outcome of miltitary operations. The first part of the book deatils warfare during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the armies had to keep advancing in order in replemish their supplies. If the army stayed in the same area over a large amount of time such as Napoleon's army in Moscow, than the army would run out of supplies. This situation did not change during the Franco-Prussian War in which the Prussian army had to scrounge for food at the outskirts of Paris. All though food remained a problem for the armies there was always a plentiful supply of ammunition since armies of the 18th and 19th centuries expended very little of it. Martin Van Creveld makes some surprising claims in the later part of the book describing twentieth century warfare. Martin Van Creveld believes that the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to failure because of the logistical constraints of the German army. Because most of supplies delivered to the German army were by rail, the desturuction of the railways impeded their advance. Also German planners made no plans to deal with the massive traffic jams in Belgum. The next chapter Van Creveld has an revisionist appraisal of the Germany invasion of Russia in 1941. Van Creveld believes that Germany had the supplies to deal with winter warfare but the inability to transport them across Russia. Due to the difference between German and Russian rail tracks and maintance problems of German engines the supplies never reached the front. Van Creveld strongly criticizes Rommel's handling of the North Africam campaign. Rommel advance to far for his supplies to be replenished. The problem of supply duirng the North African War was that the supplies had to be delivered by trucks that were highly vulnerable to air attack. When Rommel tried to solve the problem by taking Tobruk, he only made matters worse. The ships that arrived at Tobruk were in range of Allied aircraft and as a result sunk. The final Chapter, Van Creveld evaluates Allied operations in Western Europe. Van Creveld believes that Patton's success had to due with the fact that Patton ignored logistic officer's plan for a slow a orderly pace but instead took advantage of the situation to advance quickly. Van Creveld theorizes that Montgomery's narrow front approach could have logistically reached Northwest Germany but were have not captured Berlin. I would highly reccomend this book for anyone who wants a new and interesting perspective about operations during the First and Second World Wars.
Book Description
What is it like to be in battle? John Keegan, a senior instructor at Sandhurst, the British Military Academy, speaks for soldiers who were present in the fray.
For examples, Keegan selects Agincourt in 1415, Waterloo in 1815, and the Somme in 1916. What is common about them, what is different? Agincourt was hand-to-hand combat, thrust and cut--a fearful and personal encounter. At Waterloo, 400 years later, the battle was still largely personal. As it swayed back and forth, men on opposite sides came to recognize the same individuals they had fought off in previous charges.
Keegan closes his book with the Somme. For him it stands as the distillation of wars in the industrial age: long-distance killing of faceless men by others who merely activate the instruments of destruction.
Customer Reviews:
Reads like a PhD Thesis.......2007-09-21
I have read many recent historical works of John Keegan including has book on WWI and the Price of Admiralty. I enjoyed them both. So, I was very disappointed when I tried to get into the Face of Battle. The language was so stilted, the use of commas and long run-on sentences going in differnet directions was so painful that I almost stopped reading it. The book has an excellent premise: how to describe three important battles in three very differnt centuries from the perspective of the soldiers actually doing the fighting rather than the 10,000 foot view employed by contemporary military historians who were not participants in the battle. Unfortunately, Keegen spends the first third of the book explaining what a good military historian (like himself) can or should do, focusing on the unique quality of British military historians (they are less biased because the wars were mainly fought on someone else's soil. The book improves as he gets into the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme, but a good editor could have made this a much better read. I realize this book was written in 1978, so perhaps it was, at the time it was written, in line with Keegan's academic proclivities. Not a book I would recommend to anyone other than an academic.
Post Graduate Military History .......2007-05-06
THis work lives up to the highest academic standards that I have come to expect of Keegan.He provides new insights in three epic battles ,He wets your appetite for history ,he makes it real and interesting
A classic.......2006-11-23
Keegan puts you on the scene at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. One of the earliest departures from the bird's eye, general's view, The Face of Battle captures the battles from a physical, sensory, even biological perspective. Keegan creates a model for historians to assess the ebb and flux of the battle by providing an almost socratic approach to combat inquiry.
My personal favorite is the narration of Agincourt. In this battle, the author looks at the reality of whether bodies could pile up as high as they are reputed to have done along the line of contact. He examines the effectiveness of arrows and notes that at the range given the primary effect would have been to enrage the adversary's horses and not, as is often thought, to inflict casualties. Especially fascinating was the brutal crush of fellow soldiers pressing the forward ranks into the "funnel" created by the forest, which made anything other than forward movement nearly impossible. Similarly, he captures the mayhem created in the ranks by returning cavalry, after a failed charge. And let us not forget, it isn't very easy to relieve oneself in a full suit of plate, especially with dysentary!
Engrossing<
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
On War (Oxford World's Classics)
The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050
The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (Cambridge Illustrated Histories)
