Book Description
There is an important debate raging about whether Iraq is becoming another Vietnam. Those who deny the similarities most vociferously are often those who know (or remember) the least about Vietnam. Kenneth Campbell knows Vietnam from his thirteen months of fighting there (he received a Purple Heart), and years of political organizing to get the United States out of the war. Here, Campbell lays out the political process of getting into, sinking deeper, hitting bottom, and finally pulling out of the Vietnam quagmire. He traces the chief lessons of Vietnam, which helped the United States successfully avoid quagmires for thirty years, and explains how neoconservatives within the Bush administration cynically used the tragedy of 9/11 to override the “Vietnam syndrome” and drag the nation into a new quagmire in Iraq. In view of where the United States finds itself today—unable to stay but unable to leave—Campbell recommends that the country rededicate itself to the essential lessons of Vietnam: the danger of imperial arrogance, the limits of military force, the importance of international and constitutional law, and the power of morality.
Customer Reviews:
Is Iraq like Vietnam? Yes, in many ways !.......2007-09-25
Professor Ken Campbell was a combat Marine in Vietnam in 1968-69; today he is Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Delaware. His first-hand wartime experiences coupled with his educational background give meaning and relevance to his analysis of the two wars, Vietnam and Iraq.
His analogy of what he calls two quagmires is an objective comparison, from one extremely well qualified to provide a spin-free overview. A must read for all who want no-nonsense, lucid comparisons of Vietnam and Iraq and the horrors of war.
Outstanding, emminently readable and well researched...a must read........2007-06-29
There are indeed some hard lessons of war. Professor Campbell has thoroughly analyzed the reasons for America's slow slide into the debacle of Vietnam and compared that situation to the current situation in Iraq. In both cases, there were solid reasons for the end result. In spite of all attempts to portray them as different, they are in essence, very similar.
In many respects, my experiences during the Vietnam War were similar to the author's. I was an F4 Phantom II fighter pilot at Ubon, Thailand at the same period of time. Although most of my missions were flown over North Vietnam and Laos, I flew strikes against Khe Sanh at the height of that battle. At the start of the war, I was a "true believer" in the cause and was most eager to participate. It's hard to give up ideas you've held onto so tenaciously for many years, but over time, I came to the belief that our involvement in Vietnam was a tragic strategic mistake. My recent book, Phantom Reflections: The Education of an American Fighter Pilot in Vietnam was my version of how those deeply held beliefs changed significantly over time.
At the start of the Iraq War, I had grave reservations about the wisdom of our proposed course of action for many of the same reasons I thought our Vietnam adventure was ill advised. This book does an excellent job of comparing the two situations and hopefully, will generate some significant discussions among those in a position to influence policy. Well done!
A Powerful Statement! .......2007-04-04
A Tale of Two Quagmires is a meticulously-researched
examination of how the American public was misled into
ruinous military adventures in Vietnam and Iraq and of
the "crucial lessons" that must be acknowledged in order
to avoid such debacles in the future.
Once a young, battle-hardened, Marine determined to
survive his time in a war of dubious necessity; now a
highly-regarded scholar of international affairs,
Professor Ken Campbell offers a reasoned alternative
to this cycle of deception and quagmire. In doing so
he does not entirely reject the necessity of wars:
only those without legitimate purpose and clear-cut
strategy.
The wisdom contained in A Tale of Two Quagmires has
the potential to put the United States on a road to
recapturing "the moral high ground in international
relations" and, in the process, spare humanity the
horrific consequences of such senseless and protracted
conflicts -- a gift beyond value to future generations.
Amazon.com
Iron Tears examines the Revolutionary War primarily from the perspective of British politicians, soldiers, citizens, and the royal court of King George III. In this enjoyable and enlightening book, American historian Stanley Weintraub looks at myopic King George and his ambition to hold the colonies at any price, discusses how antiwar opposition in Parliament gradually gained momentum, and studies the sentiments of the general population who were forced to pay heavy taxes to support the conflict, causing resentment and, in 1780, a riot. Despite such rumblings all around him, the insulated king failed to realize how much the situation in far-off America affected domestic issues in England and was shocked enough when he lost America that he considered abdicating his throne. Most British citizens did not take it nearly as hard; many, in fact, welcomed the chance to get back to business with the Americans, feeling that commerce had been interrupted long enough by an expensive and unnecessary war.
Weintraub also covers the battles on the other side of the Atlantic and offers profiles of the major players, particularly George Washington, who became a folk hero in Britain, earning the admiration of even those ardently against the American cause. The consequences of Britain's hiring of thousands of foreign mercenaries, some of which ended up deserting and settling permanently in America, are also discussed, along with the issue of why loyalists in the colonies failed to join the redcoats in significant numbers. Most importantly, in detailing the strategic and tactical mistakes made by Britain, the author highlights the various circumstances that greatly favored the rebellious colonies from the beginning, including the sheer vastness of America and the maddening logistical difficulties involved in sending soldiers, provisions, and messages across the ocean. Weintraub makes a compelling case that the mighty British Empire never really had a chance. --Shawn Carkonen
Book Description
For generations, Americans have been taught to view the Revolutionary War as a heroic tale of resistance, exclusively from the perspective of the Continental army and the Founding Fathers. Now, in Iron Tears, master historian Stanley Weintraub offers the first account that examines the war from three divergent and distinct vantage points: the battlefields; the American leadership under George Washington; and -- most originally -- that of England, embroiled in controversy over the war. Colonial America was England's Vietnam.
Weintraub's multifaceted analysis will forever change and expand our view of the struggle. Although Washington's army, with France's help, won the war, it is equally significant -- both then and now -- that Britain lost it. The British found themselves overwhelmed by the geographic and time constraints that prevented their military from holding on to the eighteen-hundred-mile length of the thirteen colonies, from across three thousand miles of ocean during the cumbersome era of water travel. Many in London realized that American independence was only a matter of time. Yet the British were enveloped in a fantasy world of self-delusion as the war trudged along. The unyielding George III, who ultimately threatened abdication; his lethargic prime minister, Lord North; the First Lord of the Admiralty, the corrupt Earl of Sandwich, better remembered for his paired slices of bread; and the Secretary for America, Lord George Germain, an arrogant ex-general court-martialed for cowardice in an earlier war, formed a quartet that played out of tune. As opposition to and frustration with the failing war gradually increased in parliament, in the press, and in the afflicted
mercantile sector, so did pacifist sentiment for and sympathy with their American cousins.
Iron Tears renders an unprecedented account of the fight for American independence through British eyes, while dramatically narrating the battles that were waged across the Atlantic from Lexington to Yorktown and beyond. As the general, whom the British snobbishly and demeaningly referred to as "Mr. Washington," rallied to keep his ragged and overmatched Continentals together and create a nation, "iron tears" fell from redcoat muskets and cannons, as well as from the demoralized eyes of the defeated British.
Customer Reviews:
The British perspective on the American War.......2006-12-14
This is a truly fascinating book that takes the American Revolution completely from the British perspective. If you are not well versed in the events of the American Revolution this will be a tough book to get through because it does not spend much time talking about what happens on the American side and you are assumed to know. If you are a true student of the American revolution however this is a must read. To understand the British thinking is somewhat shocking and to see the changes in government and how it impacted the war in America brings a new perspective to the Revolution. Very highly recommend for those who are well versed in the American Revolution.
"Mrs. Britannia's" Colonial "Quagmire".......2006-07-27
In the Preface, Weintraub poses a question to which he then responds within the narrative of his brilliant book: "How did relinquishing America look from the remote European side of the Atlantic?" More specifically, his extensive research focuses on the perspectives of King George III, Lord North and his cabinet, both houses of Parliament, and admirals and generals as well as London's journalists, brokers, bankers, and traders during what became "Britain's Quagmire" (1775-1783). The American Revolutionary War was certainly not popular among a majority of those on both sides of the Atlantic. In fact, only about 40% of those in the colonies favored the war and an even lower percentage supported it in England. Meanwhile, as General Washington struggled to command the dwindling Continental army and "by strength of personality held the fractious colonies together," a peacemaking process was underway in Paris.
With regard to the title of this book, Weintraub explains that Edmund Burke (MP for Bristol and an outspoken critic of colonial policy) had talked of "iron tears" being shed as America "slipped away from imperial grasp." He adds that "'Iron tears' suggests musket shot and cannonballs when fired as much in sadness as in anger. Was the inevitable separation worth a war?" Given the uncertainties in both America and Europe, it is debatable whether or not a colonial victory was "inevitable" but separation certainly was (for all the reasons listed in detail in "The Declaration of Independence") and the question remains valid: Was it worth a war? Weintraub draws upon a wealth of research resources to include responses to that question by a wide and representative variety of the war's observers as well as participants.
Non-scholars such as I will especially appreciate Weintraub's provision of sufficient historical information within which to establish a context for major developments and a frame-of-reference for them during an eight-year period. However, to his credit, he does not overwhelm his non-scholar readers with an excessive number of facts, dates, etc. In this regard, Weinbtraub demonstrates the skills of a master storyteller. I also appreciate his inclusion of sixteen illustrations between pages 238 and 239 (e.g. portraits and engravings of King George, George Washington, Lord North, Lord George Germain, Edmund Burke, Benjamin Franklin, and Charles, Earl Cornwallis) as well as two supplementary sections - "Participants" (pages 332-345) and "Source Notes" (pages 347-361) -- which broaden and deepen the narrative's frame-of-reference even more. Congratulations to Weintraub on a consistently interesting, often entertaining exploration and analysis of certain dimensions of the War for Independence which, for whatever reasons, had previously been neglected.
Those who share my high regard for this volume are urged to check out Terry Golway`s Washington's General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution, Richard M. Ketchum `s Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution, David McCullough`s 1776, Frank McLynn's 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World, and Stacy Schiff's A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America.
Well written with primary sources.......2006-07-06
I won't spend time reviewing what this book covers, since other reviewers have already done that. To support his points, Weintraub makes exclusive use of primary sources. The book is laden with primary sources. As another reviewer stated: informative but not the easiest read.
Britain's Challenge.......2006-07-01
Stanley Weintraub's book Iron Tears is useful in that his study shows those who have studied the American Revolution that it wasn't necessarily miraculous that the Americans won. Weintraub's book focuses mainly on the politics of England during the reign of King George III and the British Parliament under the ministry of Lord North, but with great attention to the American Secretary Lord George Germain. The British military leaders who served in America including the Howe brothers, Clinton, Burgoyne, Cornwallis and so forth are all discussed to show the results of their leadership or lack thereof in trying to win the war in America.
Public opinion in England was not united in support for subduing the rebellion in America. Many Members of Parliament were dubious of England's ability to win a war thousands of miles away in a relatively large geographic area. Weintraub does suggest in the beginning of the book that the British Parliament possessed the legal right to raise revenues from their subjects in America. As Weintraub mentioned, the British themselves had to bear an even greater burden in supporting their Empire. However, Parliament's efforts were often an exercise in futility as it only united the usually divided colonists. Political leadership in the Parliament was also less than remarkable, which didn't help their cause.
Weintraub's book focuses on the debates and troubles the British political leadership faced, as well as the lack of effective military leadership in America, both on land and at sea. The role of the press is also well discussed as it shows the level of dissent in the English ranks, both towards the war and even the king himself. Of course the Parliament was controlled by a large enough majority in support of the crown that even the ineffectual leadership exercised by North and Germain could be sustained in the face of growing doubt that the colonies could be held onto. We do get to see brief glimpses of the battles fought in America and how British strategies often failed or weren't properly exploited after initial victory, such as the Long Island-New York battles.
The British were also quick to pick up on perceived turmoil and dissension in the ranks of Washington's army and the American colonies as proof that their efforts to achieve independence would fail and therefore it was only a matter of time before they would be subdued. Though there were plenty of examples of incompetence or lack of resolve on the part of the British political and military leadership during this conflict, there were issues that legitimately hindered their commitment and focus to the American crisis. The conflicts and competition with other European powers for land and dominance such as France and Spain, the large expanse of the British Empire itself and the expense of having to support that expansive empire were legitimate issues that compromised England's ability to focus on and fully commit to the American War.
Without reciting all the events that transpired in the colonies during the American Revolution, Weintraub covers the campaigns fought up to the surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown and the Signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, formally acknowledging America's independence. This book attempts to show how the results of the American War for Independence wasn't really all that much of a surprise; England had a lot going against it. This is a topic that has merit and shouldn't be overlooked in studying the history of this period. Weintraub's book isn't comprehensive or all inclusive, but compelling nonetheless. I noticed a few errors like the Battle of King's Mountain being fought in North Carolina, but in actuality was just south of the border in South Carolina. I also noticed some typos in giving dates for events and individuals, most noticeable in the last section of the book on Participants.
An intriguing surprise.......2005-08-26
I voraciously read books on the American Revolution and that wonderful, rich pantheon of personalities and talent that the United States was so fortunate in having themcoming together at the same time -- Washington, Jefferson, Adams, the much underestimated and noble Mason, Franklin, Hamilton and the rest. I thought that I knew the field pretty well. This book is a big surprise and a welcome one. As a Brit (who has lived in the US for almost forty years), I knew very little of just how actively so many of the real good guys in Britain opposed the war; it reminded me in many ways of the opposition to the Vietnam War. The Amervcian Revolution is not part of mainstream British learning and very much something to forget or gloss over (as, I regret, the McCarthy era has become in the US). This really is a first-rate book, well-written and convincing. It basically shows that the whole mess was George III's obsessive determination to punish the revolting, ungrateful and unworthy colonial upstarts -- it's a good explanation of why monarchies should be declared a historical dead end. The book is well worth reading just for the way it brings alive the professionals like Clinton, the Howe brothers, and Burgoyne who tend to be faceless and cardboard characters in most world that look at the Revolution entirely from the US perspective. It has a real villain -- Lord Germain -- among the most dangerous of Britain's many dangerous upper-class twits. It adds useful and vivid details about Franklin, who is better known for his work in the French court than for his equally skilled politicing and propogandering in London. It's a shrewd book. I think it is also indispensable for anyone interested in the history of the Revolution. (And, yes, this Brit agrees that the right guys won.
Book Description
Drawing from the writings of John Dewey, Leading Through the Quagmire advocates his notion that democracy is an appropriate ethic to respond to the diverse interests, needs, and values in conflict in educational settings. Moreover, it proposes an inquiry method to harness democratic ethics for engaging in ethical deliberation and conflict resolution. This book provides the foundation for understanding ethical tensions as well as the methods and applications to reason through them. Stories and examples are provided that enable readers to understand terms such as utilitarianism, ethical tensions, religious attitudes, and eco-feminism in meaningful ways.
Book Description
Halberstam's Pultizer-Prize-winning eyewitness account of the most critical political period of American involvement in Vietnam is now designed for classroom use by Daniel J. Singal. Including a new introduction and footnotes describing unfamiliar people and events, this work is lively and accessible for students. With new maps and photographs, students can visualize the crucial political events and increase their understanding of the policy errors of the early 1960s. The Making of a Quagmire captures the story of the Diem/Kennedy era, and the fundamental misconceptions that governed American policy and the South Vietnamese perspective.
Customer Reviews:
What Should Be Learned From History.......2006-12-18
In the early 1960s, David Halberstam was a New York Times correspondent who initially viewed the U.S. political and military-advisory roles in South Viet Nam as a necessary stance against the Communist menace (as defined by Dwight Eisenhower's "domino theory" in Southeast Asia).
But his pessimism grew during tours of the nation, interviews with American military advisors and his concerns surrounding the corrupt South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. His criticism became so much of a problem to the Kennedy Administration that the president himself lobbied NYT editors to have Halberstam yanked out of South Viet Nam if his reporting continued to run contrary to the government's optimistic pronoucements.
The abridged edition - to make the text more accessible to those not familiar with this history - is a classic retrospective on how Halberstam grew to question the policies of Diem and Kennedy. It also importantly takes the reader through a journey on how he had to walk gingerly through the web of censorship that is played out between the government & the news media.
Outstanding book; this is the wrong edition to buy.......2002-01-30
Halberstam's work is a classic, outlining the dilemma that Vietnam posed to American policymakers in the early 1960s, and written in lucid, newspaper-reporting style. The author's perceptiveness is particularly striking when one considers that he wasn't even 30 years old when he covered Vietnam.
Unfortunately, this McGraw-Hill edition abridges Halberstam's masterpiece. Most of the essential pieces of the story remain, but much of the rich, colorful narrative, which makes this such a fascinating book, is lost. Hopefully, a complete version will return to print soon.
required reading.......2000-08-17
Before reading this book, my knowledge of the Vietnam war was limited to the movies I had seen on the subject, until recently when a friend recommended this book to me after a brief discussion of the war, its political agenda and its intrigue. Making of a quagmire is an extensive and thourough account of the events in 1961 and 1962 that lead to the eventual full american involvemnt in Vietnam. Halberstam provides an unbeleivable and at times jaw-dropping first hand account of the political and military events of the period, and translates with remarkable skill the frustration of the vicious circle that was the american policy in Vietnam. A must read for any one with even a slight interest in the subject
Field Correspondent Sets the Record Straight.......2000-05-29
If one wants to understand the debacle or "quagmire" know as the Vietnam War, look no further than this riveting account! In "The Making of a Quagmire," David Halberstam pin points all of the failures of the system years before the first official U.S. troops splash ashore at Danang, Vietnam. His account, a collection of observations about Vietnam under the Diem presidency, is refreshing while at the same time shocking in its findings. While many observers insisted that efforts in Vietnam were progressing so well from 1961-63, Halberstam sees the light. His expose of all the failings of the system includes candid words about the inept south Vietnamese leadership and the American advisors who grow increasingly frustrated with their mission. Most importantly though, Halberstam offers a glimpse into the life of a journalist caught in his own war of censorship.
Thought Provocative.......2000-05-05
I read this book when I was a Cadet at West Point. It changed the way I looked at U.S. policy.
Average customer rating:
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Quagmire: America in the Middle East
Leon T. Hadar
Manufacturer: Cato Institute
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
 Asia
| History
| Subjects
| Books
| Afghanistan
| Armenia
| Bangladesh
| Belarus
| Bhutan
| Brunei
| Cambodia
| Central Asia
| China
| Far East
| General
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| Hong Kong
| India
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| Japan
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ASIN: 0932790941 |
Book Description
A proposal for peace in the Middle East by a former Israeli journalist.
Customer Reviews:
Near prescience.......2006-07-19
If only George W. Bush had taken the time to read this book before he plunged the United States into the Iraq War! Hadar's 1992 prediction of disaster stemming from America's interventionist policies has come true. The civil war now raging in Iraq came about from the foolish neoconservative view that democracy could be successfully forced upon the Iraqi people. Hadar effectively refuted such ideas in this book. It is well worth reading especially today with proponents of American meddling in the Middle East planning further wars against Iran and Syria.
Book Description
In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by "chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government." Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States on a path toward massive military intervention which would ultimately destroy Johnson's presidency and polarize the American people. Into the Quagmire presents a closely rendered, almost day-by-day account of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during those crucial nine months. Mining a wealth of recently opened material at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and elsewhere, Brian VanDeMark vividly depicts the painful unfolding of a national tragedy. We meet an LBJ forever fearful of a conservative backlash, which he felt would doom his Great Society, an unsure and troubled leader grappling with the unwanted burden of Vietnam; George Ball, a maverick on Vietnam, whose carefully reasoned (and, in retrospect, strikingly prescient) stand against escalation was discounted by Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy; and Clark Clifford, whose last-minute effort at a pivotal meeting at Camp David failed to dissuade Johnson from doubling the number of ground troops in Vietnam. What comes across strongly throughout the book is the deep pessimism of all the major participants as things grew worse--neither LBJ, nor Bundy, nor McNamara, nor Rusk felt confident that things would improve in South Vietnam, that there was any reasonable chance for victory, or that the South had the will or the ability to prevail against the North. And yet deeper into the quagmire they went. Whether describing a tense confrontation between George Ball and Dean Acheson ("You goddamned old bastards," Ball said to Acheson, "you remind me of nothing so much as a bunch of buzzards sitting on a fence and letting the young men die") or corrupt politicians in Saigon, VanDeMark provides readers with the full flavor of national policy in the making. More important, he sheds greater light on why America became entangled in the morass of Vietnam.
Customer Reviews:
Review of Into the Quagmire.......2001-04-24
Very often the American public has tended to view Lyndon Johnosn as the evil villian who escalated America's involvement in the warr in Vietnam. However, few people, including historians, know how the escalation came about. In this book Brian VanDeMark does not try to justify the decisions that were made between 1964 and 1968, but tries and explain how those decisions came about. VanDeMark also shows how Johnson slowly and reluctantly led the United States deeper into what has often been called the "quagmire" of Vietnam. VanDeMark balmes the American Policy maker's ignorance of the culture and politics of Southeast Asia for the slow deepening of the conflict. VanDeMark gives teh reader a very good view of how this happened by carrying the reader through almost every major decision made by the Johnson administration throughout this time period. Writen in a very readable style the near day-to-day account helps to emphasize the snowball effect of the events. The author uses a good range of source material for this book. THere is a strong reliance on government manuscripts and primary sources of the administration. He also includes oral histories and interviews. It is by using these sources and many quotations that VanDeMark is able to carry the reader through the day-to-day accounts of what happened. This book is very important for anyone interested in the VIetnam war or American foreign policy.
Average customer rating:
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Betty Boop's Big Break
Joshua Quagmire
Manufacturer: First Pub
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
Contemporary
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| Literature & Fiction
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ASIN: 0915419491 |
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